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How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional Option: 
Lessons for the President (and others) from the 2011 Debt Ceiling Standoff 
 
Abstract 
 The current successor to a federal statute first enacted in 1917, and widely 
known as the “debt ceiling,” limits the face value of money that the United States 
may borrow.  Congress has repeatedly raised the debt ceiling to authorize 
borrowing to fill the gap between revenue and spending, but in the summer of 
2011, a political standoff nearly left the government unable to borrow funds to 
meet obligations that Congress had affirmed earlier that very year.  Some 
commentators urged President Obama to ignore the debt ceiling and issue new 
bonds, in order to comply with Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
forbids “question[ing]” “[t]he validity of the public debt.”  Others responded that 
such borrowing would violate the separation of powers and therefore that the 
President instead ought to refuse to spend funds that Congress had appropriated.  
In the end, eleventh-hour legislation averted the crisis, at least for the moment, but 
absent a substantial political realignment, there is reason to believe that a similar 
standoff could occur again. 
 This Article analyzes the choice the President nearly faced in summer 
2011, and which he or a successor may face again, as a “trilemma” in which he 
had three unconstitutional options: Ignore the debt ceiling and unilaterally issue 
new bonds, thus usurping congressional power to borrow money; unilaterally 
raise taxes, thus usurping congressional power to tax; or unilaterally cut spending, 
thus usurping congressional power to make spending decisions and arguably 
violating Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment as well.  We argue that faced 
with this choice among unconstitutional options, the President should choose the 
“least unconstitutional” course—here, ignoring the debt ceiling.  We argue 
further, though more tentatively, that if the bond markets would render such debt 
inadequate to close the gap, the President should unilaterally raise taxes rather 
than unilaterally cut spending.  We then use the debt ceiling impasse to develop 
general criteria for political actors to choose among unconstitutional options.  
Although we offer no algorithm, we emphasize three guiding principles: 1) 
Minimize the unconstitutional assumption of power; 2) minimize sub-
constitutional harm; and 3) preserve, to the extent possible, the ability of other 
actors to undo or remedy constitutional violations. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In the spring of 2011, federal officials observed that at some point later in 
the year, the federal government would be unable to meet all of its obligations 
unless the federal debt ceiling were raised.  That was not an economic 
problem.  Interest rates on United States Treasury Bills were close to zero percent, 
and the government could readily issue new debt to cover its expenses, if only 
Congress would go through the formal process of raising the debt ceiling to 
conform with the budget that it itself had then only recently approved.1  There 
was a political problem, however.  Expressing concern about long-term fiscal 
deficits, Republicans in Congress—especially those allied with the Tea Party 
movement—insisted on a dollar of current spending cuts for every dollar increase 
in the debt ceiling.2  Even as Keynesian economists warned of the dangers of 
premature austerity, Democrats, including President Barack Obama, accepted the 
Republican view that deficit reduction was imperative, but they insisted that 
increased tax revenues had to be part of the formula for achieving that goal.3  A 
standoff ensued. 
As the day of reckoning approached with no deal in place, some observers 
advanced a creative solution.  Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment, they 
noted, forbids the questioning of “[t]he validity of the public debt of the United 
States,”4 and therefore, they argued, the debt ceiling is unconstitutional insofar as 
it forbids the federal government from honoring its existing financial 
commitments.5  Accordingly, these observers contended that in the event that 
Congress and the President failed to reach an agreement, the President would be 
authorized, or perhaps even constitutionally obligated, to simply ignore the debt 
ceiling.6  This proposed gambit was quickly dubbed the “nuclear option,”7 and it 
garnered support from some prominent politicians, including former President 
Bill Clinton.8 
                                                            
1 See Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 
112-10, 125 Stat. 38 (2011). 
2 See Alan Silverleib and Tom Cohen, Latest Deficit Talks End With a Tense Exchange, CNN (July 
13, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-13/politics/debt.talks_1_debt-ceiling-short-term-
extension-debt-ceiling-hike  
3 Id.  
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. 
5 See Elspeth Reeve, Is the Debt Ceiling Unconstititutional?, THE ATLANTIC WIRE (June 29, 
2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2011/06/debt-ceiling-unconstitutional/39408/.  
6 See id. 
7 E.g., Aaron Blake, Obama Won’t Find Safe Harbor in 14th Amendment, WASHINGTON POST 
(June 29, 2011, 12:44PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/why-the-14th-
amendment-is-not-a-good-option-for-obama/2011/07/29/gIQAynPOhI_blog.html 
8 See Joe Conason, Exclusive Bill Clinton Interview: I Would Use Constitutional Option to Raise 
Debt Ceiling and “Force the Courts to Stop Me,” THE NATIONAL MEMO (June 19, 2011 
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The nuclear option had its own problems, however.  For one thing, it could 
backfire.  As a hedge against the possibility that the government would later 
default on debt issued by a President acting without Congressional authorization, 
bond purchasers might demand very high rates of interest for the “radioactive” 
bonds, thus destabilizing rather than calming financial markets.9  But even if the 
President’s unilateral authorization of new debt would pacify the markets, it 
would apparently avoid a violation of Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
only by violating separation of powers.10  After all, Article I of the United States 
Constitution gives to Congress, not the President, the power “To borrow Money 
on the credit of the United States.”11 
Thus, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner quickly announced that the 
Administration would not rely on the Section 4 nuclear option.12  Perhaps that was 
simply a ploy to increase pressure on Congress to strike a deal.  If so, it worked, 
because at the eleventh hour Congress did indeed pass legislation raising the debt 
ceiling and punting to a newly created bi-partisan congressional “super-
committee” the question of how to achieve the deficit reduction that was also 
mandated by the legislation.13  With the super-committee now having failed to 
send a legislative proposal to Congress for consideration, automatic spending cuts 
will occur, unless Congress enacts superseding legislation.14 
The foregoing events will likely have important political and economic 
implications, but this Article focuses mostly on the constitutional questions that 
were raised in the days and weeks before Congress reached its crisis-delaying deal 
in August, 2011.  With influential members of Congress having indicated that 
they intend to use the debt ceiling as leverage in future battles over fiscal policy, a 
replay of the debt-ceiling standoff remains a very live possibility.  Moreover, the 
summer 2011 crisis raised an important, but mostly unrecognized, issue in 
constitutional law more generally: What should government officials do when all 
of their options are unconstitutional?  This Article uses the 2011 debt ceiling 
crisis as a case study to begin to explore that question. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
12:03AM), http://www.nationalmemo.com/article/exclusive-former-president-bill-clinton-says-he-
would-use-constitutional-option-raise-debt. 
9  Cf. Bruce Bartlett, The Debt Limit Options President Obama Can Use, THE FISCAL TIMES (Apr. 
29, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2011/04/29/The-Debt-Limit-Option-President-
Obama-Can-Use.aspx (noting the rapid turnover of three-month Treasury bills should quickly 
resolve these fears and limit the impact of the problem).  
10 See Laurence H. Tribe, A Ceiling We Can’t Wish Away, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2011, at A23. 
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2; see Tribe, supra note 10. 
12 See This Week (ABC television broadcast July 24, 2011), transcript available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-transcript-timothy-geithner/story?id=14147682; See also 
Letter from George W. Madison, Gen. Counsel, Treasury Dep’t, to New York Times (July 8, 
2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/FACT-CHECK-Treasury-
General-Counsel-George-Madison-Responds-to-New-York-Times-Op-Ed-on-14th-
Amendment.aspx 
13 See Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, §401, 125 Stat. 240, 259 (2011).  
14 See id. at §302, 125 Stat. at 256.  
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Under a plausible description of the options President Obama would have 
faced had Congress failed to strike a debt-ceiling deal in August, 2011, every 
realistic option open to him would have violated some constitutional provision: 
Failure to pay bondholders, contractors, employees, and other persons entitled to 
money under federal law would violate Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and, in addition, the President’s obligation to “take Care that the Laws” creating 
the relevant obligations “be faithfully executed”;15 issuing new debt without 
congressional authorization would violate separation of powers; so too would 
other unilateral actions to increase government revenue, such as a Presidential 
decree raising taxes or a Presidential sale of government property without 
congressional authorization;16 simply printing additional dollars and crediting 
them to the government’s account would violate the federal statute that limits the 
amount of money in circulation,17 along with the power reserved to Congress to 
coin money and regulate the value thereof,18 and thus could be said to violate 
separation of powers and the Take Care Clause as well. 
To be sure, legitimate arguments can be made for the conclusion that 
President Obama would have had some constitutional options even if Congress 
had not acted in August, 2011.  Some commentators argue that Section 4 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment only bars a limited category of defaults—failure to pay 
bondholders but not other obligees (for example, Social Security recipients) in 
one view,19 or more narrowly still, only failure to pay principal but not interest on 
federal bonds.20  Other commentators have advanced exotic solutions, such as 
Professor Jack Balkin’s arresting suggestion that the United States could mint two 
one-trillion-dollar platinum coins, or sell the Federal Reserve an “exploding 
option” to purchase government property for two trillion dollars, and then keep 
                                                            
15 U.S. Const., art. II, § 3. 
16 See U.S. CONST., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all 
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United 
States”). 
17 See 31 U.S.C § 5115(b) (2006) (“The amount of United States currency notes outstanding and 
in circulation . . . may not be more than $300,000,000”).   
18 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. 
19 See Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth Amendment Style, 33 Tulsa 
L.J. 561, 580 (1997) [hereinafter Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets]; Michael Abramowicz, 
Train Wrecks, Budget Deficits, and the Entitlements Explosion: Exploring the Implications of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Public Debt Clause 43-45 (Geo. Wash. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Paper 
No. 575, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1874746 
[hereinafter Abramowicz, Train Wrecks]; John Berlau, Constitutional Nonsense on Debt, NAT’L 
REV. ONLINE (July 8, 2011, 12:00PM), www.nationalreview.com/articles/271329/constitutional-
nonsense-debt-john-berlau. 
20 Cf. Garrett Epps, Our National Debt ‘Shall Not Be Questioned,’ THE ATLANTIC (May 4, 2011 
7:00AM) http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/05/our-national-debt-shall-not-be-
questioned-the-constitution-says/238269/ (mentioning that perhaps only outright repudiation of 
obligations is barred, but not temporary default or delay in payment); Michael Stern, Threatening 
Default, POINT OF ORDER (July 1, 2011 6:04PM), 
http://www.pointoforder.com/2011/07/01/threatening-default-a-response-to-professor-balkin/ 
(arguing that there is a difference between default and the questioning the validity of public debt).   
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the money (credited to the government’s account by the Federal Reserve) after the 
option expires (or explodes).21  We explore these and related exotica below22 
because they help contextualize the issue, but our analysis suggests that the 
President’s only realistic options were all unconstitutional.  At a minimum, we 
are willing to assume that that is true.  If it turns out not to have been true in 2011, 
it may well be true in future crises. 
The Article proceeds in four further Parts.  Part II describes in greater 
detail the nature of the options that confronted President Obama in the summer of 
2011.  It elaborates on an exchange of views between Professor Laurence Tribe 
and one of the current authors that first appeared in essays in the New York 
Times,23 the online magazine Verdict,24 and the eponymous blog of the other of 
the current authors,25 to show that the real issue was not whether the debt ceiling 
limit violated Section Four of the Fourteenth Amendment, but which 
unconstitutional option the President ought to have chosen had the day of 
reckoning arrived. 
Part III answers that question.  For simplicity, we focus on three options 
and rank them in order, based on different criteria, from worst to least bad.  We 
conclude that the nuclear option would have been the President’s least bad option.  
Readers may be surprised at our further conclusion.  We tentatively suggest that a 
unilateral tax increase by the President comes in second place, less bad than the 
option that the President and nearly every other politician appeared to favor: 
unilaterally cutting spending. 
Part IV draws general lessons about how the President and other 
government officials should choose among unconstitutional options.  We contend 
that the task of a government official in choosing among unconstitutional options 
is to choose the “least unconstitutional” one, rather than simply to make a policy 
choice.  Policy considerations inevitably inform the analysis of what counts as 
least unconstitutional, in part because the Constitution itself nowhere allows that 
government officials may sometimes be required to disobey one or more 
provisions in order to satisfy one or more other provisions.  Nonetheless, the 
decision whether to violate one rather than another constitutional provision (or to 
violate a single provision in one way rather than another) is not, in our view, to be 
                                                            
21 See Jack M. Balkin, 3 Ways Obama Could Bypass Congress, CNN (July 28, 2011), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-28/opinion/balkin.obama.options_1_debt-ceiling-congress-coins.  
31 U.S.C. §5112 (k) grants the Secretary of the Treasury the discretion over the denomination and 
issuance of platinum bullion coins, which could arguably be used to circumvent this statutory limit 
over currency notes. 
22 See infra, Part IV. 
23 See Tribe, supra note 10Error! Bookmark not defined..  
24 See Neil H. Buchanan, The Debt Ceiling is Unconstitutional: A Reply to Professor Tribe, 
VERDICT (July 11, 2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/07/11/the-debt-ceiling-law-is-
unconstitutional; see also Neil H. Buchanan, The Debt Limit Crisis, VERDICT (July 7, 2011), 
http://verdict.justia.com/2011/07/07/the-debt-limit-crisis. 
25 See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, Professor Tribe Replies to Professor Buchanan Replying to Professor 
Tribe Replying to . . . , DORF ON LAW, (July 21, 2011 12:20 AM), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2011/07/professor-tribe-replies-to-professor.html 
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decided by an all-things-considered policy judgment.  Instead, as we explain at 
greater length in Part IV, distinctively constitutional policies—such as 
preservation of the balance of powers among the branches—should be given extra 
weight.  We also explore whether the least unconstitutional option ought, in virtue 
of that fact, to be deemed constitutional.  We ultimately disapprove of such post-
hoc re-labeling because it risks obscuring real conflicts among constitutional 
requirements and values.  
Part V concludes. 
 
II. The Budget Process, the Debt Ceiling, and the Political Crisis 
 
To understand the nature of the choices President Obama nearly faced in 
the summer of 2011, and the choices that a future President could face should the 
crisis recur, this Part begins by placing the budget standoff in context.  In this Part 
we show how the debt ceiling operates in tandem with a larger web of statutory 
and constitutional constraints on Presidential action.  
 
A. The Annual Federal Budget 
 
The federal government of the United States is funded on an annual cycle, 
with the political branches engaged each year in a process that plays a large role 
in determining the levels of spending and tax collection that the government may 
undertake.26  Those policy decisions, in combination with other, longer-term 
policy decisions, determine who receives various benefits and who bears certain 
burdens, as a result of the various programs and activities funded and operated by 
the federal government, and the means by which funds to finance the government 
are collected.27  Taken together, the short-term and long-term policies also shape, 
to a very important degree, the level and nature of economic activity at any given 
time, as well as the likely path of future economic growth, the extent of 
environmental harms and remediation, the provision of education at all levels, and 
a myriad of other variables that affect the lives of current and future citizens. 
The budget process is, therefore, political in every sense of the word.  
Federal budgetary decisions matter deeply in the day-to-day lives of people, and 
they often determine the political fates of members of Congress and the 
President.28  And as the political culture has become less cooperative over the past 
                                                            
26 See generally 31 U.S.C. § 1105 (2006) (detailing the requirements for the yearly budget 
submitted by the President). 
27 Annual decisions do not fully determine spending and taxing levels, because some spending (so-
called “entitlements”) and most of the tax code is enacted in statutes that remain in force from year 
to year.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 401 (a) & (b) (2006) (appropriating funds collected out of various 
income taxes to the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance trust fund as well as the Federal 
Disability insurance trust fund). 
28 See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 3 (3d ed. 2007) (“In 
national politics, it is now the age of budgeting.”) 
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few decades, the budgetary process has come under increasing strain.29  It is thus 
increasingly likely that we will soon enter uncharted territory, with budgetary 
gridlock forcing the President to take actions that test constitutional limits. 
 
B. The Debt Ceiling’s Purported Limitation on Borrowing 
 
The annual federal budget authorizes government agencies to carry out 
functions that require the expenditure of funds.30 When a budget is passed, the 
Treasury Department is authorized to issue funds under the federal government’s 
array of programs and contracts.31  The budget must include both the authority to 
undertake specific activities (to build bridges, to pay medical benefits, and so on), 
and the appropriation of money to spend on those activities.32 
The final appropriations bills thus provide the legal authority to take 
money that is in the federal government’s possession and spend it on authorized 
programs.  The money in the government’s possession at any moment includes 
revenues collected from taxation and other sources (such as various fees).33  If the 
money available at any given moment is inadequate to fund the appropriated 
programs, the law authorizes the Treasury to borrow funds sufficient to cover the 
shortfall.34  If the current levels of appropriated spending fall short of annual 
revenues (that is, if the government runs a surplus), the remaining funds are used 
to repay previously issued debt obligations, as those debt obligations come due.35 
Each year’s budget process, therefore, implies a change in the overall level 
of outstanding federal debt.36  If appropriated spending exceeds authorized taxes, 
then Treasury is instructed to borrow more money, under Congress’s Article I 
                                                            
29 Id. at 2-4, 108-110 (noting increased political gridlock as federal budget size grew).  
30 Generally, federal agencies cannot use funds until they have been appropriated, whether that is 
via the yearly budget or some other statutory authorization.  See 31 U.S.C. § 1347 (2006) (“An 
agency in existence for more than one year may not use amounts otherwise available for 
obligation to pay its expenses without a specific appropriation or specific authorization by law.”) 
31 See 31 U.S.C. §321 (a) – (a)(3) (“The Secretary of the Treasury shall . . . issue warrants for 
money drawn on the Treasury consistent with appropriations”). 
32 See § 1105 (a)(12)-(22).  
33 See § 3302(b) (requiring deposit of all public funds into the Treasury); § 3720 (requiring money 
collected by other agencies to be deposited with the Treasury).  For an example of the various fees 
collected by the Treasury, see the FOIA fee schedule detailed by 31 C.F.R. § 1.7 (2012). 
34 See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3104 (a) (2006) (“The Secretary of the Treasury may borrow on the credit 
of the United States Government amounts necessary for expenditures authorized by law . . .”); § 
3102 (a) (allowing the Treasury Secretary to issue bonds); § 3103 (a) (allowing the Treasury 
Secretary to issue notes).  
35 Net repayment of debt last occurred during the late Clinton administration, as the public debt 
shrank from $3,772.3 billion dollars in 1997 to $3,319 billion dollars in 2001.  See CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 126 (2010), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=10871&type=1. 
36 Reflecting this reality, every federal budget must include an up to date report to Congress on the 
level of federal debt.  See § 1105(a)(10) & (36).   
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power to borrow money on the credit of the United States.37  This instruction 
includes borrowing any funds necessary to repay the principal and interest on the 
debt obligations from previous years that have come due, allowing the aggregate 
level of debt to rise even while the federal government honors its contractual 
commitments to its creditors.38 
From an economic perspective, the annual change in the aggregate level of 
the federal government’s debt, therefore, is necessarily determined by the 
difference between spending and tax revenues authorized in the annual budget.39  
If, for example, the total debt is ten trillion dollars at the beginning of the fiscal 
year, and spending appropriations exceed tax revenues by one trillion dollars 
during the fiscal year, then the debt will go up to eleven trillion dollars (putting 
aside daily compounding of interest and similar factors).  The budget itself both 
determines the necessary change in aggregate borrowing, and authorizes engaging 
in any new borrowing that is required to carry out the will of Congress, as 
expressed in its duly-enacted budget. 
In that way, there has always been an informal “debt ceiling.”  That is, 
when Congress and the President each year determine the levels of spending and 
revenues, they also determine the path of the national debt.  The debt will be as 
high as Congress permits, and no higher.  Various agencies of the federal 
government issue estimates of how any budget will change the aggregate level of 
debt, providing that information to Congress, the President, and the public as part 
of the negotiations over each year’s budget choices.40  Subject to unexpected 
changes in the economic conditions that can alter tax revenues or require different 
levels of expenditures, 41 the passage of a new budget is necessarily a statement 
that the government is planning to owe a certain amount of money at each point in 
time.  
Even though the budget process itself is both necessary and sufficient to 
empower Congress to limit the government’s debt, the total level of debt has 
become a politically salient (albeit highly inaccurate) measure of the 
government’s “fiscal responsibility.”42  As the national debt level has risen over 
                                                            
37 See supra note 34.  
38 See § 3111, allowing the Treasury to issue new obligations in order to redeem or refund 
outstanding bonds, notes, bills, and certificates.  
39 See, e.g., JACQUELINE MURRAY BRUX, ECONOMIC ISSUES AND POLICY 393 (4th ed. 2008).  
40 See § 1105 (a)(21)(B); see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: 
FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 115-118 (2012) [hereinafter Analytical 
Perspectives], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/spec.pdf 
41 See, e.g., Analytical Perspectives, supra note 39, at 119.  
42 See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. H5678 (daily ed. July 28, 2011) (statement of Rep. McNerney) 
(“Democrats and Republicans agree that raising the Federal debt is unsustainable, that the default 
is absolutely unacceptable, and that we must set our country on a course of fiscal responsibility”); 
157 CONG. REC. H5854-55 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2011) (statements of Rep. Reed) (“Mr. Speaker, 
$14.4 trillion; $1.6 trillion every year added onto that national debt. The people in November, 
2010, spoke loudly. . . .  They want us to get our fiscal house in order.”) 
Lessons of the Debt Ceiling Standoff  
 
Page 10 of 55 
 
time, politicians and the public have expressed concern that this trend might harm 
the economy, now or in the future.43  This concern is often manifested in claims 
that the debt level is impoverishing “our children and grandchildren,”44 who will 
purportedly bear the burdens of the nation’s debt, yet receive none of the benefits 
of the activities that gave rise to the debt.45 
In the face of concerns that the debt might be rising in an uncontrolled 
fashion—even though, as noted, Congress maintains complete control over the 
level and path of federal debt—Congress began in the early Twentieth Century to 
impose a purported limit on total federal debt.  Originally enacted in 1917,46 and 
imposed in its current form beginning in 1939,47 the debt ceiling law48 imposes an 
upper limit on the face amount of debt that the U.S. government can owe at any 
time. 
This limit is, however, imposed in a peculiar fashion.  It includes in the 
total measure of the debt owed by the federal government the value of loans that 
the federal government has made to itself.49  That is, when the government’s 
internal accounts treat interagency obligations as “government borrowing” 
(without noting that the government is also lending money), then that accounting 
convention increases the debt of the United States, as defined by the debt ceiling 
statute.50  Moreover, with the economy growing over time, the government’s 
ability to finance its obligations improves as well.  The debt ceiling, however, is 
                                                            
43 See Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Frustration with Congress Could Hurt 
Republican Incumbents 17 (2011) (finding that 76 percent of respondents believe that the debt is a 
“major threat” to the national economy), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-
pdf/12-15-11%20Congress%20and%20Economy%20release.pdf. 
44 See, e.g., 175 CONG. REC. H7637 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2011) (statement of Rep. McCaul) (“Our 
debt burden in this country is so heavy, it is no longer simply a financial issue; it is a moral issue.  
We have spent and spent, racking up astronomical debt that will dampen the American Dream for 
our children and grandchildren”). 
45 This is a grossly inaccurate view of the underlying reality, in no small part because money 
borrowed today may be put to productive use that will benefit those very children and 
grandchildren, as, for example, if the government purchases land they can use for recreation or 
pays teachers to educate them.  But this is not the place for us to argue against the view that the 
government faces a long-term fiscal crisis or to suggest that even if such a crisis looms, efforts to 
redress it should be delayed until a period of sustained economic growth.  The salient point is that 
the widespread perception of the need for deficit-reduction has been lately driving federal 
budgetary priorities. 
46 See Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-43, 40 Stat. 288 (1917).  
47 See Pub. L. No. 76-201 (1939); D. ANDREW AUSTIN & MINDY R. LEVIT, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL 31967, THE DEBT LIMIT: HISTORY AND RECENT INCREASES 4 (2011). 
48 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2006). 
49 See SCHICK, supra note 28, at 124. 
50 This is not an insignificant sum.  At the end of Fiscal Year 2011, gross federal debt was 
approximately $15.5 trillion, while the debt actually held by the public (which includes all lenders, 
foreign and domestic, as well as the Federal Reserve System), was approximately $9.9 trillion.  
See US Federal Debt by Year, USGOVERNMENTSPENDING.COM (Feb. 16, 2012), 
http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/federal_debt.  The difference—more than one-third of 
gross debt—was mostly the internal obligations in the Social Security Trust Funds. 
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denominated in dollars, rather than as a percentage of national income,51 which 
effectively lowers the debt ceiling over time, unless Congress acts to increase it. 
As history has unfolded in the years since the debt ceiling statute was first 
enacted, Congress has generally acted to increase the debt ceiling as necessary, in 
line with the new accumulated borrowing needs implied by annual budgets.52  
Prior to 2011, there were brief political standoffs over proposed increases in the 
debt ceiling, with Congresses under the control of one political party using the 
debt ceiling vote to try to extract concessions from a President of the opposite 
party53—or simply using the debt ceiling vote as a moment to make speeches 
about fiscal responsibility.54  While these standoffs have arisen occasionally over 
the decades, the mid-2011 political crisis was the first time that it appeared that 
Congress might simply refuse to increase the debt ceiling, even though its own 
budget required more borrowing to fund its required spending levels, given its 
decisions about tax revenues. 
Although that crisis was ultimately defused, the Minority Leader in the 
United States Senate subsequently announced that the debt ceiling would 
henceforth become a weapon in budget negotiations.55  No longer will 
disagreements over spending, taxes, and borrowing be worked out only through 
the budget process itself, with Congress then agreeing to raise the debt ceiling to 
comport with the projected increase in debt that its own decisions require.  
Congress (or, under certain circumstances, a blocking minority of the Senate) 
might in the future refuse to increase the debt limit, engaging in political 
brinksmanship to extract concessions on policy from the other party’s leadership.  
Such maneuvers differ from the brinksmanship in normal budget negotiations, 
where members of Congress can block the government from agreeing to future 
obligations, because a refusal to increase the debt ceiling makes it impossible for 
the government to honor its current obligations, to which it committed when it 
passed its budget. 
Furthermore, although the most recent debt ceiling standoff was focused 
on federal spending itself—with newly-authorized increases in borrowing tied to 
future decreases in spending by the federal government56—there is nothing to 
                                                            
51 See 31 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (“The face amount of obligations issued under this chapter and the face 
amount of obligations whose principal and interest are guaranteed by the United States 
Government (except guaranteed obligations held by the Secretary of the Treasury), may not be 
more than $14,294,000,000,000, outstanding at one time . . .”). 
52 See AUSTIN & LEVIT, supra note 47, at 20 tbl. 2.  
53 See id. at 11-15.  
54 See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. H3756 (daily ed. May 22, 2002) (statement of Rep. Turner) (“The 
statutory debt ceiling is a law that provides the maximum amount that our Federal Government 
can go into debt.  It is one of the few tools that we have to promote fiscal responsibility and 
require fiscal discipline in this House.”) 
55 See 157 CONG. REC. S5219 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen. McConnell) (“[N]ever 
again will any President, from either party, be allowed to raise the debt ceiling . . . without having 
to engage in the kind of debate we have just come through.”) 
56 See Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, §251A, 125 Stat. 240, 256 (2011); Alan 
Silverleib & Tom Cohen, White House, Congressional Leaders Reach Debt Deal, CNN (July 31, 
Lessons of the Debt Ceiling Standoff  
 
Page 12 of 55 
 
prevent the debt ceiling from being held hostage to non-budgetary demands.  A 
sufficiently motivated bloc in Congress could require changes in various social 
policies, or national security policies, or any other politically contentious area of 
the law, before agreeing to increase the debt ceiling.  Such tactics could force the 
government to choose between violating its own commitments and making 
changes in policies that are unrelated to those existing commitments. 
With the emergence of this apparently real threat—that Congress might 
one day soon refuse to back up its budgetary commitments with sufficient 
borrowing authority—it is now possible to imagine a situation in which Congress 
and the President will reach a fatal impasse, failing to agree to increase the debt 
ceiling when obligations come due.  This would, for the first time, put the United 
States government in the position of being politically and legally unable to pay 
what is has promised to pay. 
 
C. The Applicability or Irrelevance of Section 4 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
 
If we reach such an impasse, it will become impossible for the President to 
honor his responsibilities under the Constitution to faithfully execute the laws of 
the United States.  One way to view the problem, should such a crisis arise, is to 
say that the existence of the debt ceiling law itself creates the impasse, where 
none need exist.  Without the debt ceiling, after all, the President could simply 
collect the revenues implied by the tax laws, and expend the funds implied by the 
appropriations laws, borrowing any necessary additional funds, as authorized by 
Congress.57 
In this vein, some commentary emerged during the summer of 2011, 
suggesting not only that the debt ceiling statute is an unnecessary (and needlessly 
dangerous) law, but that its existence might violate the Constitution.58  Section 4 
of the Fourteenth Amendment states, in pertinent part: “The validity of the public 
debt of the United States, authorized by law, … shall not be questioned.”59  Under 
one plausible reading of that provision, the debt ceiling statute—because it raises 
the possibility that the United States will fail to meet some of its legal obligations 
to pay money, as promised under the law—will bring the validity of the debt of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-31/politics/debt.talks_1_debt-ceiling-debt-deal-deficit-
reduction. 
57 See supra notes 33-34, and accompanying text.  
58 See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. H5296 (daily ed. July 21, 2011)(statement of Rep. Lee); Garrett Epps, 
The Speech Obama Could Give: “The Constitution Forbids Default,” THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 28, 
2011, 3:56 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/04/the-speech-obama-could-
give-the-constitution-forbids-default/237977/; Jack Balkin, The Legislative History of Section 
Four of the Fourteenth Amendment, BALKINIZATION (June 30, 2011), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/06/legislative-history-of-section-four-of.html; Johnathan H. 
Adler, Is the Debt Limit Constitutional – Part Deux, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 3, 2011, 
1:09 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/07/03/is-the-debt-limit-constitutional-part-deux/. 
59 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 4.  
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the United States into question.  If that is true, then the constitutional provision 
invalidates the statutory enactment, and the debt ceiling statute must be deemed 
invalid.  The President would then ignore the debt ceiling, ordering the Treasury 
Department to issue debt otherwise authorized by Congress.  This reading of the 
Constitution, as noted in Part I above, has become known as “the nuclear 
option.”60 
Although this interpretation is not the only plausible reading of Section 4, 
and although (as we discuss below) it is ultimately only one way to conclude that 
the debt ceiling must be set aside, there is much to be said for it.  The difficulty is 
in defining the word “questioned” in a limited and meaningful way.  The only 
guidance on this question from the Supreme Court was issued during the Great 
Depression, in Perry v. United States61:  
 
We regard [Section 4] as confirmatory of a 
fundamental principle, which applies as well to the 
government bonds in question, and to others duly 
authorized by the Congress, as to those issued 
before the Amendment was adopted. Nor can we 
perceive any reason for not considering the 
expression “the validity of the public debt” as 
embracing whatever concerns the integrity of the 
public obligations. 
 
This language from Perry offers a broad reading of Section 4 that suggests 
that the validity of the debt of the United States is brought into question whenever 
the government acts, or threatens to act, in a way that suggests that it will not 
honor all of its obligations.  This is, therefore, a statement recognizing the 
possibility (indeed, the likelihood) that holders of federal debt—that is, the people 
who have loaned money to the United States—will have reason to seriously 
question whether the United States will repay the money that it borrowed, if they 
see that the federal government has failed to live up to its other obligations.  Even 
if the government is currently paying all interest and principal on existing 
government debts, current and potential lenders will have reason to question the 
validity of the debt if, for example, they observe the federal government refusing 
to pay promised Social Security benefits or refusing to reimburse a vendor for 
services rendered to the Defense Department. 
Under this view, then, the debt ceiling is constitutionally infirm, at least as 
applied during a politically manufactured standoff, because its existence causes 
the public reasonably to question whether the federal government will soon 
choose not to honor its debt commitments.  A court that strikes down the debt 
ceiling statute or a President who ignores it, under this reading, can guarantee that 
the commitments made by the government in its duly-enacted annual budget will 
be met. 
                                                            
60 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
61 294 U.S. 330, 354 (1935). 
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Although we have considerable sympathy for the “nuclear option,” we 
recognize that the reading of Section 4 that underlies it is not beyond question.  
The quoted language from Perry, though appearing in the controlling opinion of 
the case, was not endorsed by a majority of the Justices of the Court.62  It is, 
therefore, arguably dicta.  While we are persuaded that the quoted language is 
correct on the merits—that is, that it is dangerously short-sighted not to suspect 
that any defaulted obligation will bring into question the validity of the public 
debt—the Supreme Court has not definitively endorsed that view in a legally 
binding fashion. 
In addition, it is plausible to argue that Section 4 should be interpreted 
narrowly, especially in light of the circumstances surrounding its enactment in the 
aftermath of the Civil War.63  Read in context, Section 4 chiefly targets the worry 
that, once fully readmitted to the Union, Senators and Representatives from 
Southern States (not to mention President Andrew Johnson) would deliberately 
refuse to repay debts incurred in suppressing the Confederate rebellion.64  One 
might concede that Section 4’s literal language does not limit the provision’s 
application to Civil War debts, but nonetheless take a narrow view of what 
constitutes “questioning” or “public debt,” by, for example, treating government 
failure to pay vendors for services rendered or entitlement beneficiaries their 
statutory benefits as outside the scope of the Amendment.65  Under an extremely 
narrow view, bringing the validity of the debt into question would mean that bond 
holders would only “question” the validity of the debt if they were told directly 
that the government had decided not to pay what it had promised under the terms 
of its debt instruments (which are legally-binding contracts).66 
Yet still narrower readings are available.  Consider the question of 
whether the “debt” owed to bond holders means the principal alone, or the 
principal plus the interest.  The interest payments, after all, only become part of 
the national debt when they are paid, and only if they are paid by borrowing 
money from other lenders.  In that way, interest payments on the debt are no 
different from veterans’ benefits, or the salaries of FBI agents.67  None are 
currently owed by the federal government, yet all are promised to be paid in the 
future under contracts entered into by the federal government. 
Even the deceptively simple move of stretching the definition of 
“questioned” sufficiently to sweep interest payments into Section 4 is, therefore, a 
non-trivial interpretive exercise.  We must either allow the Perry language to have 
                                                            
62 The case was decided by a 5-4 vote.  Although Justice Stone nominally concurred, rather than 
concurring only in the judgment, he wrote separately to indicate that he did not endorse the portion 
of the majority opinion in which the discussion of Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
appeared.  See Perry, 294 U.S. at 359 (Stone, J., concurring). 
63 See Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, supra note 19 at 581 n. 94 (noting the narrowest 
possible construction of § 4 would limit it to Civil War debt only).  
64 See id. at 582-87; Balkin, supra note 58. 
65 See Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, supra note 19, at 582-87. 
66 See Michael Stern, supra note 20; Abramowicz, Train Wrecks, supra note 19, at 23.  
67 Cf. Abramowicz, Train Wrecks, supra note 19, at 43-45.   
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some force, or we absurdly reduce the meaning of Section 4 to the point where 
even holders of government debt can be the victims of contractual breach without 
ever questioning the validity of the debt.  This reductio strongly suggests (at least 
to us) that the Perry language—which gives Section 4 something like its natural 
every-day meaning—is most plausible, and that the narrower readings are 
inappropriately cramped. 
Nevertheless, there remains the opposite danger of reading the 
constitutional provision too broadly.  Even if the word “questioned” should not be 
interpreted as narrowly as described above, one can reasonably worry that the 
word’s meaning might be inappropriately expanded to include nearly anything 
that might make people think twice about the federal government’s 
creditworthiness.  Surely it would go too far to find a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in any situation in which Congress seems to be unable to act 
responsibly.  While it is true that an embarrassing public spectacle on the floor of 
Congress might make people question whether the federal government is run by 
fools, and thus lead them to question whether the government will be forced to 
default on its debt at some future time, it is unreasonable to say that every 
embarrassing moment on the congressional floor actually violates Section 4 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Even under a less expansive reading of Section 4, however, there are still 
arguments that are simply wrong.  For example, economic libertarians might 
argue that the issuance of debt itself could be seen to violate Section 4, because to 
issue debt is to raise the possibility that it will not be repaid.  The practical import 
of that argument is that any increases in public debt (that is, new borrowing, to 
cover annual deficits) bring into question the validity of the public debt by 
making it possible that the government will not be able to repay the debt.68  Even 
in the absence of the debt ceiling, this argument suggests, it is possible for the 
federal government to issue so much debt that it will someday be forced to 
default.69 
This reasoning is flawed, for a very simple reason.  All current United 
States debt is denominated in dollars, which the federal government alone is 
empowered to create.70  Therefore, when the federal government issues new debt, 
lenders know that they will be repaid with dollars, and that the entity to which 
they loaned money can create those dollars as its own means of repayment.71  
                                                            
68 See Ron Paul, Default Now, or Suffer a More Expensive Crisis Later, BLOOMBERG (July 22, 
2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-22/default-now-or-suffer-a-more-expensive-
crisis-later-ron-paul.html (arguing the government has already exceeded its capability ever to 
repay its debt). 
69 See id.  
70 See 31 U.S.C. § 5118 (2006).  The Gold Reserve Act of 1934 forbade issuance of U.S. 
government obligations repayable in gold, although foreign central banks were still able to 
exchange dollars held for gold.  The Nixon administration ended the latter practice in 1971.  See 
DAVID M. ANDREWS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POWER 25 (2006).  By contrast, the bonds at 
issue in Perry were payable in gold.  294 U.S. at 347. 
71 See  31 U.S.C. § 5114 (authorizing the Treasury to print money).  Additional power to expand 
the money supply rests with the Federal Reserve System.  See THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 
Lessons of the Debt Ceiling Standoff  
 
Page 16 of 55 
 
That is why, until the summer of 2011, financial markets have treated United 
States debt securities as the equivalent of cash.72  When a security denominated in 
dollars is backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, there should be 
no risk of default.73 
There are, of course, policy and prudential reasons why a government 
might not wish to embark on a path that will require the creation of too much 
money, which is why all debt securities (public and private) face inflation risk.74  
Until now, only federal debt securities have carried no default risk.75  Here, the 
key term from Section 4 is not “questioned” but rather “validity.”  As a technical 
matter, the validity of the debt securities of the United States is beyond question, 
unless Congress arbitrarily prevents the Treasury from doing what is necessary to 
honor those debts by imposing a binding debt ceiling. 
In short, despite a legitimate range of reasonable disagreement over the 
meaning of Section 4, we think it is best read to obligate the federal government 
to pay all of its obligations but not to limit federal borrowing.   Thus, during an 
impasse of the sort that was narrowly avoided in August, 2011, Section 4 would 
require the President to refuse to honor the debt ceiling, if doing so would cause 
the government to fail to meet any of its financial obligations in a timely manner.  
But, as we now explain, a Presidential decision to avoid violating Section 4 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment would not necessarily ensure that the President avoided 
violating other constitutional obligations. 
 
D. Is the Debt Ceiling Really the Source of the Problem? 
 
Notwithstanding the controversy over the meaning of Section 4 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, however, there is an independent argument—one that 
does not rely upon the Fourteenth Amendment at all—that leads to the conclusion 
that a President must violate the debt ceiling in order to carry out the terms of the 
annual budget. 
In his popular writings about the debt ceiling crisis during the summer of 
2011, Professor Tribe pointed out that the debate might have been inappropriately 
focused on the debt ceiling law in isolation, rather than viewed in the broader 
                                                                                                                                                                  
PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 16 (9th ed. 2005), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf. 
72 See Francis A. Longstaff, The Flight-to-Liquidity Premium in U.S. Treasury Bond Prices, 77 J. 
BUS. 511, 512 (2004) (noting the high liquidity of U.S. Treasury bonds). 
73  Id. at 525. 
74 See SURESH SUNDARESAN, FIXED INCOME MARKETS AND THEIR DERIVATIVES 19-20 (3d ed. 
2009).  
75 See TIMOTHY W. KOCH & S. SCOTT MCDONALD, BANK MANAGEMENT 493 (7th ed. 2009) 
(noting that even full “faith and credit” municipal bonds as well as securities backed by Treasuries 
are still assigned a default risk).  
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context in which the debt ceiling might become binding.76  If we conceive of the 
annual budget process as creating two laws—a tax law, and a spending law—then 
it is not the debt ceiling alone that causes any Fourteenth Amendment problem, 
but rather the arithmetic implications of the three laws in combination—the 
difference between tax collections and expenditures, relative to any remaining 
room under the debt ceiling.77 
Under this view, even if one accepts our Perry-based argument above 
regarding the meaning of “questioning” the validity of the debt, it is wrong to 
blame the debt ceiling specifically for any problems that arise during a budget 
stalemate.  We could, for example, say that the tax law violates the Constitution, 
because it fails to collect sufficient revenues to make an increase in the debt 
ceiling unnecessary.  Similarly, the spending law brings the validity of the debt 
into question, by obligating the government to spend more money than it can raise 
from authorized taxes and authorized borrowing. 
There is, as we discuss further in Part III below, much to this argument.  
Even so, it is worth considering the unique nature of the debt ceiling law, to 
determine whether there is anything to the idea that there is a unique problem with 
the debt ceiling that would make it—and it alone—constitutionally problematic. 
As noted earlier, the debt ceiling is a relatively recent invention.78  The 
nation existed for well over a century without a debt ceiling, passing annual 
budgets that combined taxes and spending in various amounts.  Although the 
federal government and its debt were both relatively small during that time 
period, the debt did exist, and it did fluctuate over time, in response to differences 
in taxing and spending. 
The debt ceiling, therefore, is an appendage that was added to the system 
long after the federal government had been operating successfully.  To be sure, 
fiscal conservatives may view the debt ceiling as a very useful appendage.  Each 
time the debt approaches the debt ceiling, citizens and politicians who believe that 
government is too large can use that fact to impose fiscal discipline in two ways: 
First, as in the 2011 impasse, they can demand concessions from their political 
adversaries as the price of agreeing to raise the debt ceiling; and second, they can 
make their case to the public that the need to raise the debt ceiling reflects 
government profligacy.  Never mind that the charge need not be true: Even if the 
ratio of debt to GDP shrinks, and even if the government only runs deficits that 
are sustainable over the long term, economic growth will mean that Congress 
repeatedly runs up against the limit of the dollar-denominated debt ceiling.  The 
important point is that the debt ceiling is a visible and useful tool for imposing 
fiscal discipline—whether needed or not.  And so for those who believe that fiscal 
discipline is needed, the debt ceiling may serve an important function. 
                                                            
76 See Laurence H. Tribe, Guest Post on the Debt Ceiling by Laurence Tribe, DORF ON LAW (July 
16, 2011 5:33 PM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2011/07/guest-post-on-debt-ceiling-by-
laurence.html. 
77 See id.  
78 See supra notes 46- 48 and accompanying text. 
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But even granting that, the debt ceiling is hardly essential for imposing 
fiscal discipline.   As noted above, fiscal discipline, or any other plausible policy 
goal that the debt ceiling might help to accomplish, can be achieved in the 
absence of the debt ceiling.79  If Congress and the President think that the debt is 
too high, then they can combine tax increases and spending reductions to address 
that problem.  
By contrast, the federal government could not function without spending 
laws and tax laws.  Those laws must be specific enough to allow the executive 
branch to know how to spend money, and from whom to collect how much in 
revenues.  Allowing the debt ceiling to override one or both of the tax and 
spending laws would, therefore, create a legal vacuum, leaving the executive 
branch without guidance from the legislative branch about how to change taxes or 
spending, while maintaining a level of debt below the ceiling.80 
We do not, however, view this argument as essential to our ultimate 
conclusion.  While there are strong reasons to view the debt ceiling as a “lesser” 
law than the tax and spending laws, it is sufficient for our purposes to accept 
Professor Tribe’s point that there is an interaction problem among the laws.  And 
as we explain in the next Part, the problem is not simply that the laws conflict, but 
that they conflict in a way that gives the President no constitutional options. Once 
one recognizes that a President cannot simultaneously carry out all three laws, 
without violating the Constitution, it is necessary to determine how a President 
should decide which law to set aside.  With nothing but unconstitutional choices, 
what should a President do? 
 
III. The President’s Trilemma: Which Duty Must He Ignore, 
When He Faces Three Unconstitutional Choices? 
 
The interaction of the spending law, the tax law, and the debt ceiling law 
potentially creates an unsolvable problem.  For example, if Congress were to 
authorize spending that exceeds tax collections by one trillion dollars in a year, at 
a time when the existing federal debt is only one-half trillion dollars below its 
statutory ceiling, then the President could not execute all three laws as written.  
Faced with that impossible choice, the President risks impeachment no matter 
what he might do, because he will have failed to execute at least one duly-enacted 
law of the United States.81  He thus faces a “trilemma”: choosing one of three bad 
                                                            
79 See supra text accompanying notes 39 - 42.  
80 Congress could specify, in advance, how taxes should be increased or spending reduced, in the 
event that the debt ceiling kicks in, through “fallback” provisions in the relevant statutes.  See 
Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303 (2007) (discussing the policy and 
constitutional implications of fallback provisions).  But it has not done so. 
81  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  See also Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Interaction Between 
Impeachment and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2193, 2203 (1998) (quoting 1 
ANNALS OF CONG. 594 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)) (“What are [the President’s] duties? To 
see the laws faithfully executed; if he does not do this effectually, he is responsible.  To whom? 
To the people.  Have they the means of calling him to account, and punishing him for neglect? 
They have secured it in the Constitution, by impeachment, to be presented by their immediate 
representatives . . .”). 
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options, all of which are unconstitutional.82  While it is also possible for the 
President to combine unilateral actions on taxes, spending, and debt, we find it 
more useful to discuss the three separately.   This Part offers constitutional and 
prudential grounds in support of the conclusion that, faced with the trilemma, the 
President should set aside the debt ceiling law.  Then Part IV draws broader 
lessons about the criteria the President and other actors should use for choosing 
among unconstitutional options. 
 
A. Three Powers Reserved to Congress 
 
Article I of the Constitution grants to Congress, rather than to the 
President, all three powers at play in this debate: taxing, spending, and 
borrowing.83  Under Section 8, Congress has “power to lay and collect taxes,” to 
“borrow money on the credit of the United States,” and to “provide for the . . . 
general Welfare” through the expenditure of money.84 
While there are timeless controversies over the extent of Congress’s 
powers under Article I,85 the point here is that any such powers are in Congress’s 
hands, not the President’s, at least absent a valid delegation by Congress to the 
President.  For a President to choose unilaterally to collect taxes in a way not 
authorized by Congress, or to spend money in a way not authorized by Congress, 
or to borrow money in amounts not authorized by Congress, violates the 
separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution.86 
If Congress, either by choice or by default, puts the President in the 
position of having to violate his oath of office, how should the President proceed?  
The most aggressive approach would be for the President simply to assume all 
powers otherwise reserved to Congress, on the theory that he cannot be expected 
to obey the contradictory dictates of a dysfunctional body. 
                                                            
82  As noted in Section I, we are aware that there are some plausibly constitutional methods 
by which the President could raise money to finance the difference between spending and taxes.  
Selling national parks, selling options to the Federal Reserve, and similar ideas are innovative and 
clever, but they strike us as perfect examples of the type of action most directly implicating even 
the thinnest reading of Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  That is, if the President were seen 
selling Alaska back to the Russians, or minting large platinum coins, or anything along those lines, 
then any reasonable person would question the validity of the debt of the United States.  No 
functioning government could engage in such Hail Mary desperation plays without fatally 
undermining public confidence in all of its finances. 
83  U.S. CONST. art. I. 
84  U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8. 
85  See Gerard N. Magliocca, A New Approach to Congressional Power: Revisiting the Legal 
Tender Cases, 95 GEO. L.J. 119, 120 (2006) (noting that the question of “the scope of Congress’s 
enumerated powers” is “constitutional law’s oldest debate”).   
86  “When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, 
he can only rely upon his own independent powers,” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), which do not include those powers expressly 
granted by Article I, Section 8, to Congress. 
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But this framing of the question may be misleading.  Congress does not 
act alone, and so the President may share responsibility for its dysfunction.  Did 
the President sign the budget bill that put Congress on a collision course with the 
debt ceiling?  Did he threaten to veto a bill raising the debt ceiling if it contained 
(or did not contain) some other provision he disapproved (or insisted upon)?  The 
trilemma occurs as a result of a systemic failure rather than simply from 
Congressional dysfunction.  
Moreover, as we elaborate at greater length in Part IV, even if the 
President bears no substantial responsibility for the trilemma, the better approach 
is to determine the path that would do the least violence to the constitutional 
prerogatives of Congress, allowing the President to engage in the most minimal 
course of action possible, while doing everything possible to allow the Congress 
later to undo what the President does, if Congress ultimately determines that the 
President’s extraordinary (but necessary) exercise of power was unwise. 
This suggests that Congress itself could provide guidance regarding its 
priorities among the three possible courses of action, explaining or revealing 
which of the three powers it cares about the least.  Naturally, any such analysis is 
comparative, because Congress should rightly be concerned about guarding all of 
its enumerated powers.  The question is not which choice is best, but which is 
least bad. 
Among the three possibilities, the taxing power would seem to be the most 
important power reserved to Congress.87  From the founding, the notion of limited 
government was, in significant part, a commitment to a limitation on the power to 
tax.88  “No taxation without representation” is only the most memorable of the 
expressions of this idea, reserving to the people’s representatives the power to 
collect taxes.89  That power is also the first of Congress’s powers listed in Section 
8 of Article I.90  Certainly, we are unaware of any situation in which a President 
has attempted to collect taxes without authorization by Congress; and it is difficult 
indeed to imagine any Congress acceding to such a usurpation of its powers. 
Regarding the spending power, the picture is a bit more nuanced.  In the 
early years of the Republic, Congress passed laws that authorized the President to 
spend “up to” certain sums of money, and the President would accordingly be 
                                                            
87  See, e.g., Tucker v. Ferguson, 89 U.S. 527, 575 (1874) (“The taxing power is vital to the 
functions of government.  It helps to sustain the social compact and to give it efficacy.  It is 
intended to promote the general welfare.  It reaches the interests of every member of the 
community.”).  
88  See Charles Lockhart, American and Swedish Tax Regimes: Cultural and Structural 
Roots, 35 COMP. POL. 379, 385, 391–92 (2003) (explaining that the United States’ tax revenues 
remain low in relation to other industrial countries because of its historical “fidelity to a neo-
Lockean conception of limited government” which stems from the time of the American 
Revolution). 
89  See e.g., Judge Grant Dorfman, The Founders’ Legal Case: “No Taxation Without 
Representation” Versus Taxation No Tyranny, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2008) (noting that 
the phrase has become the “’mother’s milk’ of American history education”). 
90  U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8. 
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able to carry out his constitutional duties while spending money in amounts not 
precisely specified by Congress.91 
In most areas of the federal budget, however, that practice has long since 
ended.  Congress now typically specifies precise amounts of money (or, in the 
case of so-called entitlement programs, precise formulae to determine the 
amounts of money to be spent) that the President must spend for each authorized 
program.92  When Congress appropriates the money necessary to fund those 
authorized programs, it effectively orders the President to spend no more and no 
less than those amounts.  It would be odd, indeed, if a President were to assert that 
he could choose to, say, send Medicare beneficiaries less money than they would 
be entitled to receive under the relevant statute. 
Moreover, we need not speculate about what would happen if a President 
were to assert such authority.  The impoundment controversy during the Nixon 
Administration involved a direct confrontation between the executive and 
legislative branches, with Congress objecting to Nixon’s theory of an “imperial 
Presidency,” in which the President would have the power to selectively reduce 
certain spending programs at his discretion.93 
The result was the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, under which the 
President may only propose “rescissions” of appropriated spending.94  Congress, 
however, need not act on such proposals, and the President’s power to withhold 
funds ends after forty-five days.95  Congress, therefore, has made a strong 
statement of principle, affirming its power under the Constitution to set the exact 
sums of money to be spent on each program, not merely the upper limits. 
Arguably, moreover, the Impoundment Control Act was unnecessary to 
affirm Congress’s powers.  While other provisions of that law have surely helped 
to create mechanisms for resolving disputes among the branches, lower courts 
ruled uniformly against President Nixon’s attempts to impound funds, on 
constitutional grounds, even before Congress acted.96  Passage of the Act mooted 
                                                            
91  See Roy E. Brownell II, The Constitutional Status of the President’s Impoundment of 
National Security Funds, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1, 22–30 (2001) (discussing early laws 
under which “President Washington was given broad discretion over appropriations through the 
use of ‘lump-sum’ appropriations” to expend funds or leave funds unexpended as he saw fit). 
92  See W. Cent. Mo. Rural Dev. Corp. v. Donovan, 659 F.2d 199, 202 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(“Unexpended appropriations are generally subject to congressional action.”).  For further 
discussion of direct-spending legislation and entitlement programs, see ALLEN SCHICK, THE 
FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 57–81 (3d ed. 2007). 
93  See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 235–40 (1973); Thomas 
E. Cronin, A Resurgent Congress and the Imperial Presidency, 95 POL. SCI. Q. 209, 215–16 
(1980). 
94  Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§ 681–688 
(2006).  See Cronin, supra note 47, at 221. 
95  2 U.S.C. § 683 (2006).  See SCHLESINGER, supra note 47, at 477. 
96  See SCHLESINGER, supra note 47, at 397.  See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 
1363, (D.D.C. 1973) (“It is not within the discretion of the Executive to refuse to execute laws 
passed by Congress but with which the Executive presently disagrees.”); Campaign Clean Water, 
Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 361 F. Supp. 689, 700 (E.D. Va. 1973) (holding that an impoundment of 55% 
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those cases before they reached the Supreme Court, but the fundamental idea that 
the power to spend implies the power to spend in exact amounts is persuasive, in 
our view, and also strongly implied by the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the 
Line Item Veto Act in Clinton v. City of New York.97 
For the immediate purpose of determining Congress’s priorities, however, 
it is the passage of the Impoundment Control Act itself that provides useful 
guidance for future controversies.  Congress has demonstrated, both by passing 
the Act and by refusing to grant subsequent presidential rescission requests, that it 
wishes to guard its power to spend against presidential encroachment. 
Finally, what about Congress’s power to authorize the borrowing of 
money?  The existence of the debt ceiling law, of course, suggests that Congress 
wishes to limit the amount of money that the government can borrow.98  In 
practice, however, Congress has generally treated the debt ceiling as a symbolic 
measure or at most, a bargaining chip.  Each time an increase in the debt ceiling 
has been resisted, it was generally understood that the dollar limit of the debt 
ceiling was being used opportunistically.99  Even President Obama, when he 
served in the Senate, once voted against a debt ceiling increase, with no indication 
that he was doing so because of concerns about the specific limit involved.100  
Taking a stand on the national debt was politically useful, but no one doubted that 
Congress would ultimately raise the debt ceiling. 
Yet this line of reasoning might suggest the importance of the debt ceiling 
in case of a real impasse.  That is, if Congress ever actually were to refuse to raise 
the debt ceiling, then that would be a surprising and unmistakable statement that it 
cares deeply about the level of debt.  As we argue below, however, it is difficult 
to reconcile that inference with Congress having passed tax and spending laws 
that would otherwise require an increase in the debt.  In any case, Congress’s 
refusal to change any of the three laws—which is the situation that gives rise to 
this entire analysis—gives us no reason to think that it cares more about its power 
to limit borrowing than about its other powers.  At most, through a failure to raise 
                                                                                                                                                                  
of funds allocated to the Water Pollution Control Act was a “flagrant abuse of executive 
discretion” and, therefore, void).  
97  524 U.S. 417 (1998).  Even Justice Scalia, who dissented in Clinton, acknowledged that 
President Nixon was mistaken in his assertion of a constitutional power to impound appropriated 
funds in the teeth of a Congressional command to spend those funds.  See id. at 468 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (citing Train v.  City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975)). 
98  See 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2006). 
99  See Anita S. Krishnakumar, In Defense of the Debt Limit Statute, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
135, 156 (2005) (stating that Congress has used “votes on debt limit increase legislation . . . as a 
vehicle for passage of budget-reform or other unrelated legislation”).  The debt ceiling law has 
been  treated “as a dangerous ‘weapon’ used by Congress to force the President to make 
uncomfortable compromises on issues unrelated to the debt.”  Id. at 138 & n.18.    
100  See U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 109th Congress – 2nd Session, United States Senate, 
www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&session=2
&vote=00054 (last visited Feb. 19, 2012) (listing then-Senator Obama as voting “Nay” on H.J. 
Res. 47 in 2006).   
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the debt ceiling, Congress could be read to be saying that it no longer cares less 
about protecting its borrowing powers. 
It is not surprising that reading Congress’s collective mind regarding these 
foundational principles is difficult.  Each specific power granted to Congress 
under the Constitution is important on its own merits.  As a comparative matter, 
however, it is difficult not to view the debt ceiling as the least important 
manifestation of Congress’s efforts to protect its prerogatives, as we now 
elaborate. 
 
B. Rules of Interpretation, As Applied to the Debt Ceiling Controversy 
 
When legal provisions are in conflict, or in cases of ambiguity, various 
interpretive doctrines are available to resolve the issues at stake.  In the case of the 
debt ceiling, the two most useful doctrines both point in the same direction, 
suggesting that the debt ceiling should give way when it is in conflict with the 
taxing and spending provisions of the government’s budget. 
The “last in time” rule suggests that Congress’s most recent enactments 
provide the best guide to its priorities.101  Congress legislates in light of existing 
law, and thus it presumably knows when it is passing new legislation that would 
make it impossible for the President to meet his obligations under both the older 
and newly-enacted laws. 
In the case of the debt ceiling, the Congress in Spring 2011 passed a 
budget.102  According to all estimates available at the time, that budget implied 
that the government would reach its official debt limit in May, and all of the 
executive branch’s permissible delaying tactics would be exhausted by early 
August, before the end of the fiscal year.103  Yet the budget called for levels of 
spending and taxes that would require increases in the debt to levels beyond the 
                                                            
101  See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (noting that when two legal 
instruments conflict, “the one last in date will control the other”); Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 
754, 757 (9th Cir. 1991) (“When two statutes conflict the general rule is that the statute last in 
time prevails as the most recent expression of the legislature’s will.”).   
102  See Janet Hook, Congress Puts Haggling Aside to Pass 2011 Budget, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
15, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703983104576263143090402796.html.   
103  See James Risen, Debt Ceiling Increase is Expected, Geithner Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/18/us/politics/18debt.html?ref=federalbudgetus (“The 
administration says the legal debt limit, now just over $14 trillion, will be reached next month [in 
May].  Many economists have warned that if the ceiling is not raised, the United States will soon 
begin to default on its debt, and that could set off an international financial crisis.”); Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury: No Change to August 2 Estimate Regarding Exhaustion of 
U.S. Borrowing Authority (July 1, 2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/tg1225.aspx; Erika Gudmundson, Secretary Geithner Sends Debt Limit Letter to 
Congress, TREASURY NOTES BLOG (Apr. 4, 2011), 
http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/letter-to-congress.aspx  (describing the tactics 
available to the executive branch in order to delay a default). 
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statutory limit.104  If the last-in-time doctrine has any purchase here, it leads to the 
conclusion that Congress must not have wanted the President to enforce the debt 
ceiling.  If Congress had cared about the debt ceiling, it had all of the tools 
necessary to avoid a conflict that would lead to the President’s trilemma. 
Another useful interpretive doctrine states that “the specific dominates the 
general.”105  This maxim captures the idea that general statutes adopt policy goals 
that have some weight, but that drafters of statutes legislate in more detail when 
they mean to specify a particular result.  If the general statutes can be carried out 
without conflicting with other laws, then they must be followed.  If not, however, 
then Congress’s attention to detail should trump its more general statements. 
Of course, the debt ceiling is in one sense very specific.  It states a precise 
number beyond which the national debt may not rise.106  But the taxing and 
spending laws are much more specific than the debt ceiling statute, in that they 
express Congressional will on a host of specific details, rather than just one 
number.  For the reasons discussed in Part III.D below, that specificity should 
strongly point the President towards setting aside the debt ceiling when he is 
faced with the trilemma.  To put the point briefly, the legislative effort inherent in 
the taxing and spending laws represents such a delicate balancing act that we must 
presume that Congress’s intent would be frustrated to a much greater degree by a 
President who elevates the blunt instrument of the debt ceiling above those other, 
highly nuanced laws, than by a President who subordinates the debt ceiling to 
Congress’s decisions about spending and taxes. 
But suppose Congress wanted the President to observe a hard debt 
ceiling—one that would prevail over budget and tax laws that called for spending 
that leaves a shortfall which would otherwise necessitate borrowing beyond the 
debt ceiling.  Does our application of the canons of construction render such a 
choice impossible?  Hardly. 
If Congress really wanted a hard debt ceiling, it could so specify in the 
debt ceiling and/or its budget and tax bills.  For example, the debt ceiling statute 
might state something like the following: “In the event that any future Act 
appropriates funds in amounts that cannot be paid without borrowing beyond the 
limits of this debt ceiling, such future Act shall be construed to authorize the 
President to decline to spend such sums as he, in his sound discretion, deems 
appropriate to impound.”  That sort of debt ceiling law would work a partial 
                                                            
104  See MINDY R. LEVIT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41633, REACHING THE DEBT 
LIMIT: BACKGROUND AND POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 14–15 (2011) 
(noting that “the federal government will have to issue an additional $738 billion in debt on net 
above the current statutory limit to finance all obligations for the second half of [fiscal year 
2011].”). 
105  See, e.g., Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 929 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that “a more 
recent and specific statute” controls over a general statute); Greene v. U.S., 79 F.3d 1348, 1355 
(2d Cir. 1996) (“When two statutes are in conflict, that statute which addresses the matter at issue 
in specific terms controls over a statute which addresses the issue in general terms, unless 
Congress has manifested a contrary aim.”). 
106  31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2006) (stating that the federal government may not at any time have 
outstanding debt obligations exceeding $14,294,000,000,000). 
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repeal of the Impoundment Control Act and if Congress were then to pass a 
budget that required borrowing beyond the debt ceiling, the budget would be 
construed in light of the debt ceiling law as prioritizing budget cuts.  But in such a 
scenario, the President would not be cutting spending because cutting spending 
would be less unconstitutional than ignoring the debt ceiling; in such a scenario, 
cutting spending would not be unconstitutional at all (so long as the particular 
spending cuts did not violate Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment or some 
other constitutional provision).  Put differently, Congress can insist on a hard debt 
ceiling, but it may have difficulty prospectively insisting on a hard debt ceiling as 
a favored unconstitutional option. 
 
C. The Practical Issues Raised by Presidential Unilateralism 
 
Beyond Congress’s own indications of its priorities, there are practical 
questions that arise when considering which of the three powers of Congress the 
President might usurp, when faced with a trilemma.  Examining the ease or 
difficulty of carrying out one or another option might offer guidance about the 
President’s best course of action, thereby helping to answer the question of which 
unconstitutional option is least unconstitutional.  We return to the question of why 
such pragmatic considerations bear on the relative measure of unconstitutionality 
in Part IV. 
 
1. When the President Cuts Spending 
 
President Obama, along with many commentators, concluded in the 
summer of 2011 that he would be forced to violate the Constitution by spending 
less than Congress had authorized and appropriated, in the spending law.107  If he 
had followed through, how would that have happened? 
Those who were worried about the validity of the public debt—either for 
constitutional reasons, or out of concern that failing to pay the nation’s creditors 
could create a financial and economic crisis—suggested that the President could 
simply set aside funds to pay those obligations that he deemed to be the most 
important.108  So long as the President did not use the opportunity to exact 
political retribution, or to impermissibly target certain groups in a way that would 
violate equal protection, this approach would simply entrust to the President the 
power to decide who should not be paid. 
                                                            
107 Of course, the President did not say that spending less than Congress had appropriated would 
violate the Constitution, but the conclusion follows from our discussion of the impoundment 
controversy.  See supra, text accompanying notes 91-97. 
108  See, e.g., Rep. Tom McClintock, McClintock: Debt Reduction Means Difficult Decisions, 
WASH. TIMES, Jul. 27, 2011 (“President Obama has both the legal authority and constitutional 
obligation to prioritize payments to prevent a default.  The problem is that a lot of other bills 
would go unpaid . . . .”), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/27/debt-
reduction-means-difficult-decisions/.  See also LEVIT, supra note 59, at 13 (discussing different 
legislation proposals made by congressmen that would prioritize the payment of certain 
obligations, such as the principal and interest on debt or Social Security benefits, over other 
obligations).   
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As it turns out, however, doing so would be surprisingly difficult under the 
laws and procedures that usually govern federal spending.  Because tax revenues 
arrive at the Treasury daily, in varying amounts, the government’s ability to pay 
its bills without borrowing will depend on which bills happen to come due on the 
days when it happens to be collecting sufficient tax revenues.109  A Social 
Security check that could not be paid on Tuesday might be payable on 
Wednesday.  However, even if the Tuesday payment is not made, there will be 
other payments that are due on Wednesday.  If the amount of tax revenue coming 
in during Wednesday would be enough to pay Wednesday’s bills, but not both 
Tuesday’s carryovers plus Wednesday’s bills, then someone will still not be paid. 
Under current law, if the government has enough money in the Treasury 
on any given day to pay the bills that are then due, it must pay those bills.110  The 
debt ceiling does not override that requirement, because there would be (by 
assumption) sufficient non-borrowed funds to cover the day’s required 
expenditure.  If the President tried to argue that he must prioritize the older unpaid 
bills over the current bills, Wednesday’s would-be recipients could reasonably 
argue that there is no principle under the law that authorizes the President to set 
priorities in that way.  Tuesday’s recipients should, under an equally plausible 
argument, be out of luck until there is enough money to pay a particular day’s 
recipients plus all unpaid carryover bills.  And if such a day never comes, then 
there is no reason why the earlier obligations are more binding than the later ones.  
The short-term timing of these payment streams is, in most cases, a matter of 
happenstance. 
The analysis could also be affected by the nature of the payments that are 
due.  In some cases, a day’s or week’s delay is little more than an annoyance, 
while in others, justice delayed is truly justice denied.  For example, a person who 
is owed money by the federal government could be relying on that money to fund 
a down payment on a house, where even a day’s delay can be sufficient to unravel 
an entire sale—or even a series of sales, where the seller in one deal expects to 
use her proceeds to become the buyer in a related sale.  Again, the nearly-random 
timing of the specific payment obligations, in conjunction with the equally 
random timing of tax receipts, suggests that it would be difficult indeed to create a 
principled priority system that forces some recipients to wait while others are 
paid. 
                                                            
109  The Financial Management Service publishes a Daily Treasury Statement that reports the 
amount of revenue received by the Treasury, daily withdrawals, and debt transactions on a given 
day.  See FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SERVICE, Overview, DAILY TREASURY STATEMENT (Dec. 4, 
2009), www.fms.treas.gov/dts/overview.html. 
110  See LEVIT, supra note 59, at 7 (stating that the U.S. Treasury is required “to make 
payments on obligations as they come due” because it “lacks formal legal authority to establish 
priorities to pay obligations”).  See also Binyamin Appelbaum, Treasury to Weigh Which Bills to 
Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 27, 2011 (noting that Social Security benefits might go unpaid if the debt 
limit is reached because of the requirement that the Treasury make payments as they become due), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/28/business/economy/treasury-to-weigh-which-
bills-to-pay.html. 
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This problem would become even more difficult if the President were to 
try to hoard funds from day to day, in anticipation of high-priority obligations that 
are expected to arise in the near future.  For example, if the President knows that 
certain interest payments to government bond-holders will be due on Friday, and 
he does not expect there to be enough money coming in on Friday to cover those 
payments, he might refuse to make payments earlier in the week, even when the 
concurrent flow of tax revenues would otherwise be sufficient to cover the 
payments due on those days.  If Treasury is required to pay money due, when it is 
due, so long as there is money on hand, then certainly the disappointed would-be 
recipients of those payments could bring actions against the government. 
But, one might ask, wouldn’t the President make these decisions at the 
wholesale level? The President could establish a formula of the following sort: 
Bondholders and military personnel get paid in full; the remaining shortfall is then 
made up by an equal percentage cut among all prospective federal payees, based 
on Treasury’s projection of the size of the shortfall.  Such an algorithm would not 
require Treasury or the President to decide whom to pay and how much on a day-
by-day basis. 
We concede that it is possible to rewrite the laws and procedures to allow 
any set of priorities to be met, but the process of doing so requires more changes 
to the law and to executive procedures than might at first be obvious.  Moreover, 
even if the President does not engage in the kinds of impermissible favoritism that 
unilateral spending cuts might allow, assumption of the power to choose among 
decision procedures greatly expands the power of the President to make choices 
that cross the line into policy decisions—without any delegation of that power to 
him by Congress.  Setting up rules that protect would-be recipients of certain 
payments, of course, necessarily disfavors others.  For the President to make such 
choices without prior Congressional authorization is for him to assume significant 
legislative power.111 
In short, seemingly simple rules like “across-the-board cuts” or 
“prioritization of bond holders” turn out, on the ground, to be anything but simple.  
Telling the President to pick winners and losers is both to confer awesome power 
and to increase the likelihood of arbitrary harm to innocent parties. 
 
2. When the President Increases Borrowing 
 
If the President, instead of cutting spending, decides to ignore the debt 
ceiling, how would he proceed?  The issuance of government debt is significantly 
less complicated than the determination of government spending levels, because 
debt is a relatively undifferentiated (and completely monetizable) asset.  Whereas 
spending cuts can result in something as serious as missed chemotherapy 
treatments, or as inconsequential as delays in reimbursing a person’s travel 
expenses, borrowing money is a simple concept.  No one is forced to lend money, 
and the government simply borrows as much as it needs to cover its appropriated 
                                                            
111  See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text (explaining that the U.S. Treasury, an 
executive department, does not have the legislative authority to prioritize payments).   
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spending, and no more.112  Other than the details of the maturities of the debt 
instruments, the process is straightforward and unremarkable. 
From an administrative standpoint, therefore, the issuance of debt poses no 
difficulties.  There are federal employees who regularly go through the process of 
issuing new federal debt, using well-established mechanisms to interact with 
potential lenders in the financial markets.113  If the President wishes to issue 
additional debt, even if that debt would bring the government’s total borrowing 
level above the current ceiling, he can easily issue an order to do so.  The 
recipients of that order would know exactly what to do, without having to make 
judgment calls, and without needing to alter any other laws or procedures that are 
currently in place. 
As a practical matter, therefore, exceeding the debt ceiling is the essence 
of simplicity, especially compared to cutting spending.  The more difficult 
practical question, however, is how the potential lenders to the United States 
would react to the offer of new debt securities that appear to violate the borrowing 
clause of Article I, Section 8.114  Would such lenders assume that the new debt is 
still backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, even though only the 
President has authorized the borrowing? 
In part, the answer to this question depends upon the degree of political 
dysfunction that attends the crisis at hand.  If it appears that the negotiations 
passed the witching hour by mere bad luck, but that things will soon return to 
normal, then it is easy to imagine that the subsequent legislative compromise will 
include an after-the-fact guarantee of the validity of what we will call the 
“Presidential bonds.”  If, however, it appears that the political crisis will be 
longer-lasting, then the risk to lenders is higher, making them likely either to 
refuse to lend, or to require higher interest payments (thus exacerbating the 
government’s long-term borrowing problems). 
If the government simply defaults up front, we can expect markets 
immediately to respond badly, making it more difficult and expensive to return 
the government to its status as a preferred borrower.115  Avoiding default by 
issuing potentially illegitimate debt, however, can lead to the same result.116  The 
irony, therefore, is that a President’s attempt to avoid default on government 
                                                            
112  See  LEVIT, supra note 59, at 2. 
113  The Bureau of the Public Debt is the agency within the U.S. Department of the Treasury 
that issues debt obligations to the public in order to finance government operations.  This agency 
handles the sale of government securities on the primary and secondary markets.  It also auctions 
about $4.5 trillion in securities annually.  See BUREAU OF THE PUBLIC DEBT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
THE TREASURY, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2009–2014 8 (2008), available at 
http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/whatwedo/bpdstrategicplan09-14.pdf. 
114  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
115   See also LEVIT, supra note 59, at 11–12 (noting that a default could lead to “a downgrade 
of the U.S. credit rating, an increase in federal and private borrowing costs, damage to the 
economic recovery, and broader disruptions to the financial system.”).   
116  The issuance of potentially illegitimate debt could reduce investor confidence in the 
federal government’s commitment to meet its obligations.  A loss of investor confidence could 
result in much higher interest rates on the potentially illegitimate debt.  See id. at 11. 
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obligations might cause precisely the real-world problem that it is designed to 
avoid. 
The difference, however, is in degree.  A straight default on obligations, 
especially debt payments, ends any pretense that the government is a reliable 
financial player.117  Issuing bonds of uncertain reliability will almost surely 
increase borrowing costs, but any such increase can be no more than the increase 
that would attend an up-front default. 
Moreover, the underlying factors that could make the Presidential bonds 
less valuable are factors that would independently have even more catastrophic 
effects on the economy as a whole.  If, even after failing to make an eleventh-hour 
compromise, Congress and the President still cannot come to an agreement to end 
the trilemma, then there will be reason to worry for the future of the nation.  Even 
the regular budget process, which precedes the possible creation of any trilemmas, 
would be so broken as no longer to permit the proper functioning of the 
government. 
Accordingly, if the President had good reason to conclude that the market 
would demand intolerably high interest rates for Presidential bonds, then on that 
basis he might appropriately rule out ignoring the debt ceiling as the solution to 
the trilemma.  But in such a scenario, it would be a policy consideration—the sub-
junk status of the prospective Presidential bonds—rather than a constitutional 
consideration per se, that would take the issuance of new debt off the table.  
Conversely, however, if the President had good reason to believe that financial 
markets would only demand a tolerably small interest premium for the 
Presidential bonds, so that issuing them would make financial sense, then our 
analysis suggests that this path should be constitutionally preferred because the 
key constitutional consideration—how much legislative power the President must 
usurp in order to carry out the solution—favors issuing new debt over canceling 
appropriations. 
In short, while unauthorized issuance of debt would hardly be ideal, and 
would carry with it risks of financial and economic disruption, it would be a more 
rational and administrable process than asking the President to enact unauthorized 
spending cuts.  If it would work, it would thus be a less unconstitutional course 
than unilateral Presidential spending cuts for two reasons.118 First, ignoring the 
debt ceiling would usurp less legislative authority than would unilateral 
Presidential spending cuts, thus making the former a less severe violation of 
separation of powers.  Second, ignoring the debt ceiling would also prevent the 
government from failing to meet its legal obligations to pay its bills and thus 
violating Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment.119 
 
                                                            
117 Again, at least initially, the lack of confidence would not be based on any underlying economic 
reason, but solely because the political system is creating a false crisis and a wholly unnecessary 
trilemma for the President.  Once the crisis takes hold, of course, the damage could spread to the 
real economy. 
118 We elaborate more fully on what we mean by degrees of constitutionality in Part IV, infra. 
119 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 4. 
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3. When the President Increases Taxes 
 
Finally, what are the practical issues that would arise if the President 
resolved the trilemma by increasing taxes, to levels above those authorized by 
Congress under the tax law?  Taxes lie somewhere between debt and spending in 
terms of their heterogeneity.  Asking a government to “borrow money” is (again, 
other than certain technical matters, especially the maturity dates of the new debt) 
a rather unambiguous request.  Asking it to “collect taxes” necessarily implicates 
a broader range of questions, covering the tax base (that is, what to tax), the rates 
of taxation, and the likelihood of tax evasion and avoidance. 
Because of these unknowns, the decision to increase taxes automatically 
confers powers upon the President (who, throughout this analysis, is assumed to 
be acting without authority of Congress), with significant policy implications.  
For example, if the President decided to collect the necessary funds by increasing 
estate taxes, that would have quite different effects than if he authorized an 
increase in excise taxes. 
Even so, increasing taxes appears to raise somewhat fewer issues of 
complexity than cutting spending.  Collecting more money from people than they 
expected to pay might cause hardship, and it might unravel some transactions that 
would otherwise take place, but the tax collectors would not face all of the types 
of questions that budget cutters would face in the scenarios described above. 
From a purely administrative standpoint, moreover, collecting more taxes 
is fully within the capacities of the agencies over which the President exercises 
authority.120  He could, for example, simply instruct the tax authority to increase 
withholding on all regular paychecks, under the income tax or the Social Security 
and Medicare taxes.  This process is fully automated, and the President’s 
authorization would be all that was needed to collect additional funds.  Some 
refusals to pay might follow, but because the employers withholding the taxes are 
not paying those taxes, the process could be expected to be administratively 
simple. 
Deciding to increase the taxes that are easier to collect is, of course, a 
policy choice of its own.  The burdens would not be shared equally.  This would 
be one of many reasons that the President would be sure to face fierce political 
resistance to any attempt to increase taxes.  The administrative simplicity, 
however, is a strong argument for increasing taxes, rather than cutting spending, 
in the event that the financial markets rule out the possibility of Presidential 
bonds. 
 
                                                            
120  See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2329 (arguing 
that “Congress’s delegations of power to the President logically coexist with a presumption that 
the President has ultimate control over all executive agency decisions”).  The Internal Revenue 
Service, which is responsible for collecting taxes is a bureau of the Department of the Treasury—
an executive department controlled by the President.    
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D. The Prudential Issues Raised by the President’s Choice 
 
The analysis above set aside many policy issues, focusing instead on the 
practical implications of each possible solution to the trilemma.  At least as 
important, however, are the prudential questions that are raised by different types 
of unauthorized presidential actions.   Such considerations suggest a different set 
of tradeoffs, based on the likely effects of a President’s choice, both in the 
immediate crisis, and the precedent that he would set for the country going 
forward. 
The political branches of government are at their most political (in both 
good and bad senses) when taxing and spending are involved.  While Congress 
has agreed over the years to delegate its authority to coin and regulate money,121 
for example, it has never allowed technocratic agencies to determine the levels 
and types of taxes and spending that the government undertakes.  Election 
campaigns are often fought over issues of taxes and spending, and any 
compromises are designed to trade off important priorities, benefits, and costs.122 
When Congress agrees to a spending law, it therefore is making a 
statement about the importance of various choices, both absolutely and relatively.  
If Congress as a whole determines that there should be a certain level of social 
spending versus military spending, for example, it is almost surely true that each 
member of Congress would have preferred a different balance.  The ultimate 
spending bill, therefore, represents in raw form the political balance of power in 
any given year.   
Similarly, the tradeoffs involved in designing the tax laws is also deeply 
political.  A Senator who would prefer a pure consumption tax allows the income 
tax to continue, on the condition that certain types of saving are exempt from 
taxes.  A believer in low corporate tax rates negotiates a compromise in which she 
allows somewhat higher rates, on the condition that the recognition of certain 
corporate income can be deferred.  The nature and complexity of the political 
choices is limited only by the imaginations of the parties to the negotiations. 
Putting the taxing and spending decisions together, as the process of 
determining the budget and appropriations proceeds, multiplies the ways in which 
the result is best viewed as a set of quid pro quos and understandings that each 
                                                            
121  See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FEDERAL RESERVE 
SYSTEM, PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 85 (2005) (“Each of the twelve Reserve Banks is authorized 
by the Federal Reserve Act to issue currency, and the Department of Treasury is authorized to 
issue coin.”), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf.   
122  See William G. Jacoby, Public Attitudes toward Government Spending, 38 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 336, 336 (1994) (noting that government spending is a “significant policy issue” in U.S. 
election campaigns); Susan A. MacManus, Taxing and Spending Politics: A Generational 
Perspective, 57 J. POL. 607, 607 (1995) (“[T]axing and spending issues are increasingly at the 
forefront of most elections.”); Gerald F. Seib, Taxes Emerge as Defining Issue for 2012 
Campaign, CAP. J., Sept. 19, 2011 (arguing that taxes are an important issue in every election, but 
will be particularly significant in the 2012 election because of the nation’s economic distress), 
available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903374004576580710594126704.html. 
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member of Congress expects to be honored.  These tradeoffs and balances fully 
satisfy no one, of course, but they are hammered out in the atmosphere of a 
representative body that is constitutionally empowered to make just such difficult 
choices. 
The debt ceiling could be viewed as merely part of this mixture of 
tradeoffs.  When Congress passed the 2011 budget in spring 2011,123 perhaps it 
did so in the full knowledge that what its members were agreeing upon would 
never be enacted.  If that were true, however, it would suggest that the debt 
ceiling was being used as a bait-and-switch mechanism, with one side acting in 
bad faith, never intending to honor the compromises over taxing and spending to 
which it had agreed. 
In any event, the question posed by the trilemma is not whether the will of 
Congress might be frustrated by the President’s choice about how to proceed.  
The key issue is which choice least threatens Congress’s higher priorities.  If 
Congress passes a budget that implies a level of borrowing, yet it also leaves in 
place prior legislation that purports to forbid that new level of borrowing, a 
President who ignores the debt ceiling will honor the most recent—and, we would 
argue, most important—of Congress’s stated priorities, allowing the absolute and 
relative magnitudes of taxes and spending mandated by Congress to be carried 
out. 
The worst that can happen in such a case is that Congress would need to 
undo the damage in a future budget.  That is, if the President’s guess is incorrect, 
and Congress’s highest priority was to prevent the national debt from exceeding a 
certain dollar amount, then Congress has the power to pass budgets in future years 
with surpluses sufficient to return to the debt level that it prefers.124  The damage 
that might be wrought in the meantime, or by having to live under a more austere 
budget in future years than otherwise, is a cost of ignoring Congress’s will today.  
The costs of allowing a President to violate the balance of Congress’s priorities in 
taxing and spending, however, are much more difficult to undo. 
Finally, the prudential tradeoffs inherent in the trilemma can be framed as 
a question of how much power each choice confers on the President.  For the 
foregoing reasons, it seems clear that the President would minimize his 
assumption of power by issuing debt than by rebalancing taxing and spending 
choices.  Or, to put it in partisan political terms, which choice would be the least 
worrisome, from the standpoint of a member of Congress who is not from the 
President’s party?  While reasonable people might offer different answers to that 
question, giving the President the power with the least latitude—and that is most 
easily reversed—strikes us as the prudent choice, no matter which parties control 
the various political bodies. 
 
                                                            
123 See Hook, supra note 57. 
124 Indeed, as noted above, see supra text accompanying notes 106-107, Congress can even 
prospectively couple a “hard” debt ceiling with a delegation to the President of the power to 
impound appropriated spending. 
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E. The Hierarchy of Choices 
 
Our analysis, therefore, is not designed to favor one party or ideology over 
another.  We believe that anyone who values the separation of powers, and who 
wishes to protect Congress’s prerogatives under the Constitution, would be best 
served in the first instance by making sure that no President is ever faced with 
such a choice.  If the political system fails, however, the President can best honor 
the balances inherent in the Constitution by ignoring the debt ceiling. 
But as we noted above, markets could react so badly to the prospect of 
Presidential bonds as to reduce the President’s trilemma to a dilemma: unilaterally 
cut spending or raise taxes.  Which of these options would be less 
unconstitutional?  Surprisingly, our hierarchy of choices tentatively suggests that 
the President’s second-best choice would be to raise taxes.125  In addition to the 
administrative advantages noted above, raising taxes rather than cutting spending 
would not shortchange persons who are legally entitled to government funds.  
Thus, raising taxes, like ignoring the debt ceiling, avoids a violation of Section 4 
of the Fourteenth Amendment,126 whereas spending cuts, depending on their size 
and apportionment, could violate Section 4 in addition to separation of powers. 
It is curious that during the summer of 2011 so many commentators and 
politicians considered the choice to cut spending as not merely the least bad 
choice, but actually a constitutionally valid choice.127  We, by contrast, recognize 
that all of the President’s choices would be unconstitutional, and we believe that 
the worst choice would be for the President to seek to cut spending below the 
levels authorized by Congress. 
What explains this difference in perspective?  Partly, we candidly admit 
that our own conclusion about the relative constitutional merits of the President’s 
unilaterally cutting spending versus raising taxes is substantially less certain than 
our conclusion that ignoring the debt ceiling is less bad than either of the other 
options.  After all, the tax code is filled with deductions and credits that serve the 
same economic function as spending,128 and so increases in taxes, even when 
                                                            
125  Note also that the President’s choices to increases taxes would be immediately 
justiciable, once a person paid their higher level of tax liability and sought a refund. 
126  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. 
127  See Binyamin Appelbaum, Debt Ceiling Has Some Give, Until Roof Falls In, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/business/economy/05debt.html (noting that 
the Republican plan to prioritize interest payments if the debt limit is reached necessarily requires 
spending cuts); Sen. Jim Demint, More Spending Is a Threat to America, POLITICO (Jan. 24, 2011, 
4:50 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0111/48020.html (suggesting that government 
spending is a greater threat to the full faith and credit of the United States than increasing the debt 
limit); Carl Hulse, Boehner Outlines Demands on Debt Limit Fight, N.Y. Times (May 9, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/10/us/politics/10boehner.html (reporting that Speaker Boehner 
demands “trillions of dollars in federal spending cuts in exchange for [Republican] support of an 
increase in the federal debt limit).   
128  See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: 
A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 706–07 (1970) 
(explaining that tax expenditures are similar to direct spending because they promote 
governmental aims and giving examples of tax expenditures found in the tax laws). 
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easier to administer than cuts in spending, may implicate the very same sorts of 
policy tradeoffs.  From the perspective of separation of powers, therefore, the two 
could be seen as equally unconstitutional. 
In addition, there is a palpable sense that unilateral increases in taxes by 
the President are unthinkable in a way that unilateral spending cuts by the 
President are not.129  We fully acknowledge that, as noted above, this sense that a 
President just can’t do that would certainly constrain the President from raising 
taxes as a matter of politics.  Still, it is not clear that this political constraint is a 
constitutional constraint.  To be sure, longstanding practice is a factor in 
constitutional interpretation, and while there is a tradition of Presidents spending 
less money than Congress appropriated,130 there is no tradition of Presidents 
raising taxes.  But there is less to this point than meets the eye, because there is 
also no tradition of Presidents spending less money than Congress appropriated, 
when Congress has required that the appropriated sums be fully spent.  
Thus, we would stick with our tentative conclusion that, if faced with the 
dilemma of unconstitutionally raising taxes or unconstitutionally cutting 
spending, the President would act less unconstitutionally by raising taxes.   We 
are substantially more confident in our conclusion that he would act still less 
unconstitutionally by ignoring the debt ceiling, so long as the bond markets 
cooperated sufficiently to convert the dilemma into a trilemma, 
By now, however, readers may be wondering exactly what we mean when 
we say that one course of action is more or less unconstitutional than another.  
Isn’t constitutionality an on/off condition, like pregnancy?  We hope that the 
discussion so far shows why the answer is no. In the next Part, we build on the 
foregoing analysis to develop a more general account of degrees of 
unconstitutionality. 
 
IV.   Beyond the Debt Ceiling: The General Problem of No 
Constitutional Options 
 
The prior Parts of this Article conceptualized the choice President Obama 
nearly faced in the summer of 2011 as a choice among unconstitutional options.  
We also offered views about how a President ought to choose among the 
particular unconstitutional options of unilaterally raising taxes, unilaterally cutting 
spending and unilaterally issuing debt.  Readers may disagree with our ordinal 
rankings.  Readers may even disagree with our contention that the only realistic 
options during the debt ceiling crisis were all unconstitutional.  But we hope that 
most readers will agree with us that the general problem warrants further 
consideration.  In this Part, we analyze the problem in general terms: How should 
government officials choose among unconstitutional options? 
                                                            
129  See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.  See also MacManus, supra note 76, at 
623 (discussing a survey of different age groups that showed “all age groups overwhelmingly 
prefer spending cuts to tax increases.”). 
130  See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
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One might think that when faced with no constitutional options, the 
President (or some other legal actor) is freed of constitutional constraint, at least 
where the President (or other legal actor) has not himself created the 
circumstances necessitating a fateful choice.  For concreteness, suppose that 
Congress had failed to raise the debt ceiling in the summer of 2011 and that 
Congress alone bore responsibility for that failure.  President Obama might then 
have reasoned as follows: Congress has put me in the untenable position of 
having to violate the Constitution, so Congress cannot now be heard to complain 
if I usurp one, rather than another, of its powers.  Although we have some 
sympathy for such a sentiment,131 we think it is ultimately wrong, and 
dangerously so. 
The costs of constitutional violations will be borne by the People, not just 
Congress, both in a practical sense—because people will be required to forgo 
payments or pay higher taxes now or in the future—and in a constitutional 
sense—because structural constitutional provisions ultimately serve the People, 
not the institutions they directly protect.132  Thus, even when Congress has wholly 
avoidably created a constitutional trilemma (or other multi-lemma) for the 
President, he cannot use that fact as a reason to, in effect, punish the People.  
Furthermore, the “all bets are off” line of reasoning has no logical 
stopping point.  If the necessity of violating the Constitution in some way 
empowers the President to violate the Constitution in any way, then a 
constitutional multi-lemma gives the President potentially unlimited power.  To 
stick with the debt ceiling example, he could, in violation of the constitutional 
allocation of war making powers,133 unilaterally order the armed forces to invade 
Venezuela or Iran, sell its oil on the world market, and use the proceeds to make 
up any shortfall between appropriations and revenues from authorized taxing and 
borrowing.  He could, in violation of Alaska’s equal suffrage in the Senate (and 
other constitutional limits),134 sell Alaska back to Russia.  And so forth.  We think 
it clear from these and other examples that might be adduced that not all 
constitutional violations are equivalent. 
Once one recognizes that some constitutional violations are worse than 
others, however, there arises the difficult question of developing metrics for 
comparison.  We do not attempt to formulate an algorithm but we do think that 
some general principles can be stated, most of them implicit in our discussion of 
the debt ceiling crisis in Parts II and III.  After explaining why the problem is less 
                                                            
131 Below we explain that reasoning of this sort may warrant the conclusion that the courts 
generally should treat a political actor’s choice among unconstitutional options as presenting a 
non-justiciable political question.  See infra text accompanying note 201.  
132 See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. __,  131 S.Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (“States are not the sole 
intended beneficiaries of federalism.  An individual has a direct interest in objecting to laws that 
upset the constitutional balance between the National Government and the States when the 
enforcement of those laws causes injury that is concrete, particular, and redressable. Fidelity to 
principles of federalism is not for the States alone to vindicate.”) (citation omitted). 
133 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11-18. 
134 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 & amend. XVII.  
Lessons of the Debt Ceiling Standoff  
 
Page 36 of 55 
 
rare than one might think, the balance of this Part elucidates three criteria to guide 
the choice: Minimize the unconstitutional assumption of power; minimize sub-
constitutional harm; and preserve, to the extent possible, the ability to undo or 
remedy constitutional violations. 
 
A. The Scope of the Problem 
 
There is virtually no legal doctrine governing the choice among 
unconstitutional options.  That absence partly reflects the fact that the 
Constitution’s commands are almost entirely negative, forbidding rather than 
requiring certain actions.  For example, government officials may not deprive 
persons of life, liberty or property without due process, but they generally need 
not take any affirmative steps to provide persons with various protections and 
benefits.135  Accordingly, when faced with the temptation to act 
unconstitutionally, government actors can usually satisfy the Constitution by 
simply doing nothing. 
However, government actors sometimes labor under affirmative duties.  
Two such duties were at issue in the debt ceiling crisis.  The Take Care Clause 
imposes one duty.  The President’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed is best understood as an affirmative duty to execute the law.136  Thus, 
although justiciability doctrines limit the ability of private parties to seek court 
orders to the Administration to carry out the law,137 the duty exists nonetheless.  A 
President who refused to execute some law would, at a minimum, need to explain 
to the public (and perhaps to members of Congress seeking to impeach him) that 
the law is either unconstitutional138 or that refusal to execute the law in some set 
of circumstances was a valid exercise of prosecutorial discretion.139 Simple non-
enforcement would be, prima facie, a breach of constitutional duty.140 
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment indicates another affirmative duty 
of the President.  Suppose that some bonds or other government bills came due.  
Suppose further that, under the best interpretation of Section 4, failure to pay the 
bondholders and other bill submitters would call into question the public debt, and 
thus violate Section 4.  That conclusion is a conclusion that Section 4 imposes an 
affirmative obligation.  Phrased in the passive voice (“shall not be 
                                                            
135 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201-02 (1991); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t 
of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989).  
136 See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 
1471 (1988).  
137 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
138 See Presidential Auth. to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 199 (1994). 
139 See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President's Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 
2280, 2293 (2006). 
140 See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“Article II, 
Section 3 . . . . does not permit the President to refrain from executing laws duly enacted by the 
Congress as those laws are construed by the judiciary.”) 
Lessons of the Debt Ceiling Standoff  
 
Page 37 of 55 
 
questioned”),141 the provision’s language draws no distinction between acts that 
would call the public debt into question and omissions that would do so.  Indeed, 
one would expect that in the usual course Section 4 would most frequently apply 
to omissions (namely, failures to pay). 
Nor is the President the only government actor with affirmative 
obligations under the Constitution.  For example, government officials have 
affirmative duties to persons in their custody, such as prisoners.142   
Or consider the situation of a trial judge faced with a request by a criminal 
defendant to restrict press access to courtroom proceedings in some way in order 
to guarantee a fair trial.  Doing nothing is not in any meaningful sense an option.  
To be sure, the trial judge could order that the indictment be dismissed on the 
ground that there is no way to fully honor both the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights and the First Amendment rights of the press.  In a sense, that would be 
doing nothing.  But we think—and as we explain below, the courts think—that 
this is too high a price to pay to avoid choosing the lesser constitutional evil. 
In light of the fact that government actors will, from time to time, need to 
choose among unconstitutional options, how should they make that choice?  We 
next elaborate three salient principles. 
 
B) Minimize the Unconstitutional Assumption of Power 
 
In our discussion of the practical dimensions of the various horns of the 
trilemma in Part III, we noted how a Presidential decision to ignore the debt 
ceiling would require a smaller exercise of distinctively policy judgment than 
would be required by a decision to cut spending or raise taxes.  That factor 
matters for the comparative constitutional analysis because of the nature of the 
underlying violations.  Any Presidential decision to tax, borrow, or spend (or not 
spend) without congressional authorization violates the principle of separation of 
powers because the powers to tax, to borrow and to spend (or not spend) are all 
allocated to Congress, not the President.143  But in so allocating power, the 
Constitution also allocates to Congress the power to make the innumerable policy 
tradeoffs and compromises that go into a budget.144  Indeed, one could readily say 
that the Constitution allocates to the most representative branch of the federal 
                                                            
141 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.  
142 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-04 
(1976).  
143 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, cl. 1-2 & 9, cl. 7; 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States §§ 903-908 & 1051 (1st ed. 1833).  See also CLINTON ROSSITER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 226 (1948) 
(discussing President Lincoln’s unauthorized advancement of two million dollars of un-
appropriated funds to three private citizens).  
144 See STEPHEN E. FRANTZICH & CLAUDE BERUBE, CONGRESS: GAMES AND STRATEGIES 9 (4th 
ed.  2010); JAMES J. GOSLING, ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY 64 (2008) 
(noting that Congress’s choices in the budgetary process “represent an amalgam of compromises 
and accommodations that have presidential initiatives as their starting point.”).  
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government the powers to tax, borrow and spend precisely because the exercise of 
these powers involves inherently political choices. 
One might plausibly disagree with our conclusion that the President 
assumes more legislative policy power when he unilaterally cuts spending than 
when he unilaterally raises taxes.  One could even disagree with our conclusion 
that the President assumes more legislative policy power when he unilaterally cuts 
spending or raises taxes than when he unilaterally issues Presidential bonds.  But 
we hope that no one will disagree with our underlying view that, other things 
being equal, as between two ways of unilaterally exercising legislative power in 
violation of the Constitution, the President should choose the course in which he 
unconstitutionally exercises less legislative power. 
In choosing whether to usurp the legislative power to borrow, tax, or (not) 
spend, the President apparently faces a choice among roughly commensurable 
constitutional violations.  Each power is allocated to Congress, and so the 
President compares apples to apples in choosing whether the constitutional 
balance of power will be more or less upset by his unilateral exercise of one rather 
than another power. 
Yet the actions in question are not exactly commensurate: One might think 
that taxing is somehow more quintessentially a legislative power than borrowing 
or spending,145 in which case one might conclude (contrary to our own tentative 
conclusion in Part III), that the constitutionally worst option would be for the 
President to unilaterally raise taxes.  Further, depending on which unilateral 
course the President chooses, he might violate constitutional provisions beyond 
separation of powers.146  As we discussed in Part III, a Presidential decision 
unilaterally cutting spending would potentially violate Section 4 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as separation of powers.  Meanwhile, a Presidential decision 
to unilaterally raise taxes could be said to violate the provision of Article I 
requiring that bills raising revenue must originate in the House of 
Representatives.147  There is no agreed-upon metric for aggregating and weighing 
these respective constitutional violations.  Indeed, so far as we are aware, there 
does not even appear to be any awareness of the potential problem. 
                                                            
145 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION 77 (2010); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton).  
146 For example, the President’s choice to cut spending could violate the due process clause where 
entitlement benefits were impacted.  See also supra text accompanying note 134. 
147 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.  
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The relevance of the Fourteenth Amendment to the analysis highlights an 
important, more general, problem: Some circumstances might require a President 
or other legal actor to trade off structural constitutional violations, such as 
separation of powers, against rights provisions, such as Section 4 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  And if you think that Section 4 is not a rights provision, 
consider a hypothetical variation on the debt ceiling crisis that clearly does 
involve a rights provision. 
Suppose that Congress purported to “solve” the debt ceiling impasse by 
raising the debt ceiling by an amount insufficient to cover the existing shortfall, 
but that, in violation of the Takings Clause148 and (maybe) the Bill of Attainder 
Clause,149 Congress made up the difference by including in the same bill a 
measure confiscating the holdings of a small number of extremely wealthy 
individuals named in the bill.  Could the President sign the bill on the theory that 
violating the Takings Clause and (maybe) the Bill of Attainder Clause would be 
no worse than usurping legislative power, as he would have to do under the 
trilemma if he vetoed the legislation? Or, conversely, is it categorically worse to 
violate two constitutional provisions or doctrines—the Takings Clause and the 
Bill of Attainder Clause—than to violate just one—the separation-of-powers 
doctrine?  Would the confiscation plan be constitutionally equivalent to unilateral 
Presidential action cutting spending because each action involves two distinct 
constitutional violations? 
We would reject the notion that the key question is the number of 
constitutional provisions at stake.  Perhaps if other things were equal, then one 
could say that it is worse to violate n+1 constitutional provisions than to violate n 
constitutional provisions.  But more broadly, we think it fairly clear that any 
measure of comparative constitutional harm should be qualitative, not 
quantitative—or at least not merely quantitative. 
Consider an admittedly fanciful example.  Suppose a criminal madman 
slips undetected into the Oval Office and, holding a loaded gun to the head of the 
President, orders him either: (1) to instruct FBI agents to perform a warrantless 
search of the home of the criminal’s ex-wife, and charge her with possession of 
obscenity when they find a copy of Lady Chatterley’s Lover; or (2) to unilaterally 
declare war on Iran and order a nuclear strike against Tehran.  Assuming the 
President is unwilling to take a bullet for the Constitution (as the consequence of a 
refusal to make a choice),150 we think it fairly clear that the President should 
choose option (1).  Option (1) is not only less harmful than option (2), but also 
less unconstitutional, even though option (1) involves violating two constitutional 
provisions (the Fourth and First Amendments), whereas option (2) only involves 
violating one (the allocation to Congress of the power to declare war).151 
                                                            
148 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
149 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
150 In the next sub-Part, we shall have more to say about whether the President or other 
government official must always choose a constitutional option, if available, even if the only 
constitutional options are catastrophic.  For now, readers who think that the President should 
simply refuse to choose should imagine a variant on the hypothetical example in which the 
madman informs the President that if the President refuses to choose either option, the madman—
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What we take to be shared intuitions about the foregoing example also 
undercut any suggestion that rights are trumps152 in the sense that one should 
always prefer violating some non-rights provision to violating a rights provision.  
Rights may be trumps in the sense that they prevail against most utilitarian 
goals,153 but they are not trumps in the sense that they always prevail against other 
(non-rights) constitutional provisions.  Indeed, constitutional doctrine allows that 
rights can generally be overridden by a law that is narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling interest,154 whereas most non-rights provisions do not appear to 
permit such overrides.  For example, the legislative veto is not permitted even if it 
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest,155 whereas a law that abridges 
freedom of speech or uses a suspect classification would be valid if it had those 
characteristics.156 
That difference suggests that perhaps the opposite presumption should 
apply.  In other words, perhaps non-derogable constitutional provisions (like the 
Article I, Section 7 requirements at issue in the line-item veto case) should 
generally prevail over derogable ones (like the rights to free speech and to equal 
protection).  We think that there may be a limited sense in which such a 
presumption in fact makes sense: Complying with separation of powers, 
federalism or other non-derogable constitutional limits could, in principle, be the 
sort of compelling interest that justifies use of a race-based classification or a 
content-based regulation of speech.157 
                                                                                                                                                                  
who is, among his other talents, an excellent mimic—will impersonate the President and order 
both the violation of the rights of the madman’s ex-wife and the nuclear strike on Tehran.  Thus, 
in this modified example, failure to choose itself leads to unconstitutional actions. 
151 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
152 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi-xv & 367 (1977). 
153 See RONALD M. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 370 (1985).  
154 For this reason, Professor Schauer has aptly stated that rights are better understood as shields 
rather than trumps.  See Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REV. 
415, 429-30 (1993).  
155 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).   
156 See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725-26 (2000). 
157 Cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2677, 2681 (2009) (stating that 
compliance with Title VII could be a compelling interest justifying presumptively impermissible 
race-conscious public employment measures).  
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But one must be careful not to run too far with this line of analysis.  
Although saving the President’s life certainly counts as a compelling interest, we 
do not think it would be accurate to say that it is therefore constitutionally 
permissible for the President to order the FBI to charge the gun-wielding 
madman’s ex-wife with obscenity for possessing non-obscene materials.  First 
Amendment doctrine is not derogable on this particular: It does not utilize the 
compelling interest test to determine what qualifies as obscenity.158  Likewise, 
neither is doctrine under the Fourth Amendment, the other rights provision in our 
hypothetical case, exactly derogable.  To be sure, there are exceptions to the 
warrant requirement, and some of them—such as the exigent circumstances 
exception159—are based on compelling interests, but the doctrine does not directly 
ask in particular cases whether to sacrifice the right for the sake of a compelling 
interest.160  So the possibility of using existing doctrine under a constitutional 
right to accommodate a structural constitutional provision will not always be 
available. 
Moreover, even when a right can be overridden by a compelling interest, 
the doctrine assumes that overriding the right is necessary to achieve that 
compelling interest in some non-fortuitous way.161  Yet the gun to the head of the 
President bears the wrong sort of causal relationship to any benefit that would 
derive from charging the madman’s ex-wife with obscenity for such a charge to 
qualify as narrowly tailored to advancing a compelling interest.  We think that in 
our hypothetical example it is more straightforward and more accurate to say that 
the madman creates a choice for the President between unconstitutional options.  
To characterize one option as valid in virtue of the fact that it enables the 
President to avoid the other option is to omit the key step in the process: deciding 
which option is worse.  We shall return to this characterization issue in Sub-Part 
(C) below. 
For now, we want to note the seemingly irreducible mushiness of any 
plausible test for degrees of unconstitutionality.  It is easier to state what the test 
should not be than what it should be.  As noted above, the test should not simply 
count the number of constitutional violations.  Nor do we think that there can be 
any all-purpose hierarchy of constitutional provisions.  To use an example to 
which we shall return below, it may be tempting to say that the First Amendment 
is more important than the Sixth Amendment or vice-versa, but nothing in the 
constitutional text or our history provides a basis for either judgment.162  And one 
can imagine circumstances in which the values underlying one provision prevail 
over those underlying the other, as well as vice-versa. 
                                                            
158 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 
(1957). 
159 See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1857-58 (2011). 
160 See id. at 1858-1860.   
161 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2668 (2011).  
162 See Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976) (“The authors of the Bill of 
Rights did not undertake to assign priorities as between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment 
rights, ranking one as superior to the other.”). 
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To make that last point concrete, suppose that the gun-wielding madman 
has different priorities.  Suppose that he offers the President the following choice: 
(1) Send the FBI to the home of a potential whistleblower with instructions to 
seize and destroy documents exposing high-level government corruption;163 or (2) 
approve, and then act upon, a State Department legal memorandum asserting that 
American support for Libyan rebels in their resistance against the Gadaffi regime 
can continue without notification to Congress under the War Powers Act.164  Even 
assuming that the President believes that course (2) would usurp the war-
declaring power of Congress, he could nonetheless fairly conclude that course (2) 
is less unconstitutional than course (1) because the abuse of power entailed by (1) 
makes the violation of the Fourth and First Amendments worse in this case.  
Comparing this conclusion with the conclusion we reached with respect to the 
first set of choices discussed above in the original gun-wielding madman scenario, 
we see that the question whether one unconstitutional course is more or less 
unconstitutional than another can yield different answers in different 
circumstances, even when the exact same constitutional provisions are in play.  
Does that mean that the entire enterprise of comparing unconstitutional 
courses of action is utterly mysterious?  Not necessarily.  To say that one cannot 
devise an all-purpose formula for weighing constitutional harms against one 
another is not to say that the enterprise is hopelessly subjective.  We think that the 
sorts of factors that might be invoked in particular circumstances will often garner 
consensus.  Indeed, we are familiar with courts and political actors making the 
relevant sorts of judgments, even if we are unaccustomed to thinking of them in 
the terms described in this Article. 
                                                            
163 This scenario is not very different from what President Nixon ordered with respect to Daniel 
Ellsberg, except of course that no one was holding a gun to Nixon’s head at the time. 
164 See Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, to Att'y Gen. Eric Holder, Auth. to Use Military Force in Libya, 2011 WL 1459998 
(U.S.A.G. Apr. 1, 2011) (“We concluded that the President had the constitutional authority to 
direct the use of force in Libya because he could reasonably determine that such use of force was 
in the national interest.  We also advised that prior congressional approval was not constitutionally 
required to use military force in the limited operations under consideration.”). 
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Consider the choice courts must make in deciding whether to adopt a 
proposed narrowing construction of a statute in order to avoid a difficult 
constitutional question.  On the one hand, courts try to construe statutes so that 
they are constitutional, because invalidating a statute is a serious affront to the 
democratic will as expressed through the legislature.165  On the other hand, courts 
will not wholly re-write statutes in order to avoid a difficult constitutional 
question, because such re-writing is a different sort of affront to the democratic 
will, insofar as it usurps the legislative function.166  Which affront is worse?  The 
cases do not give a categorical answer, instead applying context-specific 
judgment to allow creative interpretation but not re-writing.  While there is no 
sharp boundary line between those activities, there can be consensus about a great 
many cases that fall on one or the other side of the boundary. 
We think the same should be true about choices among unconstitutional 
options.  In our discussion of the debt-ceiling crisis in Part III, we gave context-
specific reasons why a Presidential decision simply to ignore the debt ceiling 
would require the exercise of substantially less legislative-style policy judgment 
than the decision of what programs to cut and by how much or the decision of 
what taxes to raise and by how much.  That judgment reasonably closely parallels 
the sort of judgment courts must make in deciding whether a statute can fairly 
bear a proposed narrowing construction.  Indeed, if anything, the argument that 
ignoring the debt ceiling usurps less legislative power than either cutting spending 
or raising taxes strikes us as more decisive than common arguments for adopting 
or rejecting a narrowing construction of a statute challenged as unconstitutional.  
More broadly, here, as elsewhere, an admittedly mushy multi-factor test can still 
yield clear answers in cases far from the margins. 
 
C) Minimize Sub-Constitutional Harm 
 
Another lesson that emerges from the debt-ceiling crisis is that decision 
makers ought to try to minimize sub-constitutional harm as well as constitutional 
harm.  Here, “sub-constitutional” harm refers to real harm—economic hardship or 
even lost lives—but not necessarily harm that amounts to a constitutional 
violation.  The difference between the two madman scenarios sheds light on what 
we mean.  In both instances, option 2 involved the unconstitutional usurpation by 
the President of the power of Congress to commit the nation to war.  But part of 
what made option 2 worse in the first scenario than in the second scenario was a 
judgment about consequences: It would be worse to use nuclear weapons against 
Iran than to provide air support for Libyan rebels because the consequences of 
using nuclear weapons against Iran—the deaths of millions of Iranian civilians 
and the possibility of nuclear retaliation against the United States or its allies—
would be so much worse than the consequences of supporting Libyan rebels—at 
                                                            
165 See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932);  
166 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591-92 (2010); Reno v. Am. Civil 
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997).  
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best displacing a dictator with democracy and at worst a mostly-contained civil 
war. 
But in saying that differences between the consequences of 
unconstitutional options matter, we do not mean to say that consequences are all 
that matters.  A President’s decision to ignore the debt ceiling, we have 
emphasized, would usurp less legislative power—and would thus be less 
unconstitutional—than a President’s decision to decide which spending programs 
to cut and by how much or which taxes to raise and by how much.  Ignoring the 
debt ceiling would continue to be less unconstitutional than either of the other 
unilateral Presidential actions even if it appeared that, on balance, one of these 
other options would lead to somewhat better consequences.  Perhaps the damage 
to the economy from the government having to pay higher rates of interest on 
Presidential bonds could be expected to be greater than the damage to the 
economy from the expected loss of confidence that would arise from unilateral 
Presidential action cutting spending or raising taxes.  Even so, we think that 
ignoring the debt ceiling would be the less unconstitutional option—unless the 
differences in projected consequences were reckoned in orders of magnitude.  Put 
differently, taking the Constitution seriously—and rejecting the “all bets are off” 
approach—means giving priority to minimizing constitutional harm, while 
treating as secondary the principle that sub-constitutional harm ought to be 
minimized. 
To be sure, giving priority to the avoidance of constitutional harm does 
not mean giving it absolute priority.  If the consequences of following what would 
otherwise be the least unconstitutional of several unconstitutional paths would be 
truly catastrophic, then we think that government officials would be justified in 
choosing an otherwise somewhat more unconstitutional option that did not lead to 
catastrophe.  With this caveat, our view is analogous to what moral philosophers 
call threshold deontology: one treats certain rules as impervious to arguments for 
being overridden by consequentialist considerations, unless the expected adverse 
consequences rise above a threshold of moral catastrophe.167  For example, a 
threshold deontologist might say that torture is morally impermissible to save a 
life or even ten lives but that it is permissible to save a million lives.168  Likewise 
here, a President should not choose to cut spending or raise taxes rather than 
ignore the debt ceiling in order to save a few million dollars in GDP, but he could 
make that choice to avert a substantial chance of a worldwide depression. 
The principle of catastrophe-avoidance also applies—or at least, we would 
argue, should apply—even in circumstances in which the President or some other 
political actor has available at least one technically constitutional option.  For 
parallelism we shall call our view of this question threshold constitutionality.  Just 
as threshold deontologists are deontologists below a threshold of catastrophic 
harm, threshold constitutionalists favor compliance with the Constitution below a 
threshold of catastrophic harm.  
                                                            
167 See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISRAEL L. REV. 280 (1989); 
Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893 (2000). 
168 See Alexander, supra note 167, at 898-901.  Compare Moore, supra note 167, at 314-15.  
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We can illustrate threshold constitutionality by reference to Professor 
Balkin’s “jumbo coins” proposal.  Recall that Balkin argued that, even if 
Congress had failed to raise the debt ceiling, the President could have avoided 
acting unconstitutionally if he had instructed the Treasury Department to mint two 
one-trillion-dollar platinum coins to be deposited in the government account with 
the Federal Reserve, thereby creating an additional two-trillion dollars for the 
government to spend on its obligations.169 
We note two objections to the jumbo coins proposal.  First, the very act of 
minting trillion-dollar coins looks so cartoonish and desperate that it could 
undermine faith in the government’s ability to repay its obligations, and for that 
reason might be understood as a violation of Section 4 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.170  A public that observes the federal government resorting to exotic 
gimmicks like minting trillion-dollar coins has reason to worry that public debt 
may go unpaid.  Second, even if one takes a narrower view of Section 4—so that 
nothing short of actual default on obligations counts as a violation—the jumbo 
coins proposal would likely spook the markets, leading lenders to demand a very 
high rate of interest. 
But is that second factor a legitimate consideration absent constitutional 
necessity?  Suppose that the jumbo coins would not actually violate Section 4 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment or any other constitutional provision.  Even if minting 
the jumbo coins would have terrible consequences, would the President 
nonetheless be obligated to prefer the jumbo coin option to one of the 
unconstitutional options (such as ignoring the debt ceiling, cutting spending or 
raising taxes)?  Is there some requirement that a President (or other government 
official) must exhaust his or her constitutional options, no matter how disastrous, 
before he or she may even consider unconstitutional options?  More generally, is 
threshold constitutionality justified?  We think it is, although we also think that 
most of our analysis should be relevant to those who disagree. 
Disagreement with threshold constitutionality would lead to an absolutist 
position.  No matter how high the cost of compliance, the absolutist says that 
government officials simply may not violate the Constitution if they have any 
constitutional options.  In this view, a non-defeasible constitutional provision or 
doctrine—like the separation of powers—is just that: completely non-
defeasible.171  
For the absolutist, choices among truly unconstitutional options will rarely 
arise, because any constitutional option—no matter how outlandish or tragic—
will have to be given priority.  Under this view, the President must sacrifice his 
life to the gun-wielding madman rather than choose one of the two 
unconstitutional options; he must also choose the jumbo coins option (or some 
equally outlandish but constitutionally valid scheme) if he concludes that it is 
constitutional, even if doing so would bring financial ruin that could have been 
avoided by one of the other unconstitutional options. 
                                                            
169 See Balkin, supra, note 21.  
170 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.  
171 See CRAIG R. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 76-80 (9th ed. 2009).  
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We think that the absolutist position for rejecting threshold 
constitutionality is unjustified for the same sorts of reasons that have been 
advanced in favor of threshold deontology.  Where a deontological purist would 
avoid telling a lie even at the cost of ending the world, we would not.  President 
Lincoln most clearly expressed the constitutional equivalent of threshold 
deontology in explaining (through a rhetorical question) his willingness to 
temporarily sacrifice Congressional authority over suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus172 while the Union’s survival hung in the balance: “Are all the 
laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that 
one be violated?”173  Averting catastrophe, in Lincoln’s view and ours, warrants 
violating the Constitution. 
 That is not to deny that there is something to be said for the absolutist 
view.  One might worry that if constitutional provisions are not deemed 
inviolable, government officials will attach too little weight to them.  The 
absolutist stance is sub-optimal, in this approach, but less sub-optimal than any 
approach that rejects absolute prohibitions.  To continue the torture analogy, if the 
law purports to permit torture but only in the ticking-bomb scenario, one might 
worry that the government will start hearing bombs ticking everywhere.174  An 
absolute rule deliberately overshoots the mark to avoid the worse sin of 
undershooting the mark.175 
 Notwithstanding the foregoing logic, one might conclude—as we do in the 
present context—that there are both principled and pragmatic problems with a 
deliberately over-inclusive absolute prohibition.  If one thinks that catastrophes 
ought to be averted, then, as a matter of principle, there is something dishonest 
about pretending that one takes an absolutist stance.  Moreover, as a practical 
matter, it is hardly clear that the absolutist prohibition does not lead to over-
deterrence.  By hypothesis, threshold constitutionality only permits resort to 
unconstitutional action to avert a catastrophe, and so adopting the absolutist 
position risks bringing about catastrophes.  At a minimum, before adopting the 
absolutist position, one ought to consider the alternatives. 
One alternative would be a version of threshold constitutionality that 
incorporates catastrophe avoidance into considerations of constitutionality.  In this 
approach, catastrophe avoidance operates within constitutional law to treat an 
otherwise unconstitutional course of action as constitutional so long as it is the 
least unconstitutional of the possible courses of action that avoid catastrophic 
                                                            
172 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).  
173 See Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
174  Worse yet, the government may deliberately aggravate situations in order to justify the use of 
torture.  See Alexander, supra note 167, at 902-04 (describing the possibility of intentionally 
increasing danger in order to reach the deontological threshold).  
175 In the torture context, Oren Gross has argued that an absolute prohibition is optimal because it 
will lead to just the right amount of torture—almost none.  See Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants 
Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1486-87; 
1501-11 (2004). 
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harm.176  In the context of the debt ceiling crisis one might say something like 
this: We all thought that the separation of powers was non-defeasible but we have 
now encountered a case that leads us to conclude otherwise.  Thus, the rule that 
says that the President may not borrow money (or tax or cut spending) without 
congressional authorization should be reformulated to say that the President may 
not borrow money (or tax or cut spending) without congressional authorization, 
unless doing so is necessary to avert a catastrophe.  Call this the 
accommodationist version of threshold constitutionality: In this approach, the 
Constitution accommodates the need to avoid catastrophes by authorizing what 
might otherwise be constitutional violations. 177  Slogans like “the Constitution is 
not a suicide pact” reflect accommodationist sentiment.178 
Accommodationism has deep roots in our constitutional culture and those 
roots generally prevent courts and other political actors from even recognizing 
that constitutional duties may conflict.  Consider Nebraska Press Ass’n v. 
Stuart,179 which involved at least the potential for a conflict between the First 
Amendment right of the press to report fully on a criminal trial and the Sixth 
Amendment right of the defendant to a fair trial untainted by pre-trial publicity.  
Speaking for the Court in that case, Chief Justice Burger began by appearing to 
recognize a textual conflict.  He wrote: “The authors of the Bill of Rights did not 
undertake to assign priorities as between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment 
rights, ranking one as superior to the other.”180  He then disavowed any judicial 
power to “assign[]to one [right] priority over the other.”181  And yet, the Court 
resolved the case. 
How?  By construing the outer bounds of the First and Sixth Amendments 
so that neither infringed the other.  The Court held that the First Amendment right 
to freedom of speech and of the press can be overridden with gag orders where 
doing so is essential to ensuring a fair trial182—thus favoring the Sixth 
Amendment over the First Amendment if push comes to shove—but the Court 
                                                            
176 For similar approaches and critiques, see RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE 
CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 157-58 (2006); Benjamin A. Kleinerman, 
9/11, the Liberty/Security Balance, and the Separation of Powers, 26 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 59, 62 
(2007) (reviewing POSNER, supra).   
177 See, e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
178 This sentiment manifests frequently within the national security context.  See, e.g., Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) (“[W]hile the Constitution protects against 
invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.”); Peter Brandon Bayer, Sacrifice and 
Sacred Honor: Why the Constitution Is A “Suicide Pact”, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 287 
(2011).  See also David Corn, The “Suicide Pact” Mystery, SLATE (Jan. 4, 2002, 11:04 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2002/01/the_suicide_pact_mystery.html. 
179 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
180 Id. at 561. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 562, 570.  
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also held that in the particular case there had not been a sufficient showing that 
muzzling the press was necessary to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial.183 
Although we sagree with the substantive result of Nebraska Press Ass’n, 
we regard the Court’s claim to have avoided prioritizing rights as highly 
formalistic.  The Court said, in substance if not in form, that the fair trial right is 
more important than the free press right, at least in a case of unavoidable conflict.  
But the Court somehow managed to persuade itself that conflict was avoidable. 
What were the alternatives?  An absolutist of the sort who would insist on 
the Treasury minting jumbo coins at the cost of crashing the global economy 
might say that the conflict in Nebraska Press Ass’n was avoidable.  The defendant 
in that case was accused of murdering six people, but the Constitution does not 
require that every murderer be punished.  If it was impossible for the defendant to 
receive a fair trial and to honor the freedom of the press, an absolutist would say 
that the constitutionally required solution is to simply dismiss the indictment. 
The dismissal solution might take as its model the exclusionary rule in 
criminal procedure, which bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of 
the Fourth or Fifth Amendment.184  If there is insufficient other evidence for a 
jury to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, then the exclusionary 
rule effectively requires dismissal of an indictment.185  If that rule obtains for the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the absolutist might ask, why not for the First and 
Sixth Amendments? 
The comparison is suggestive but, we think, ultimately unpersuasive, as 
the Supreme Court’s own exclusionary rule jurisprudence indicates.  In the post-
Warren Court era, the case law has substantially whittled away at the exclusionary 
rule, recognizing numerous exceptions where the Justices find that application of 
the rule is not cost-justified.186  We think that these exceptions show that the 
exclusionary rule has not been understood in absolutist terms.  Although early 
cases invoking a judicial integrity rationale for the exclusionary rule could be 
understood in absolutist terms, the modern doctrine—which rationalizes the 
exclusionary rule as a deterrent to illegal police investigation187—shows the Court 
carefully calculating costs and benefits.  Put simply, we do not have a criminal 
procedure doctrine that instructs courts to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence 
                                                            
183 Id. at 567.  
184 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649-50 (1961); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 
(1985). 
185 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 n. 6 (1984) (discussing studies on the effect of the 
exclusionary rule on the disposition of felony arrests). 
186 See, e.g., Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and 
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 691-94 (2011); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio 
and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-
Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1399-1404 (1983).  
187 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591-92 (2006); Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court 
Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment "Search and 
Seizure" Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 933, 990-991, 997-1000, 1006-10 (2010); 
Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' 
Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 192-93; 236-238 (1983). 
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even when the results would be catastrophic.  We have more nearly the opposite: 
a set of doctrines that seek to limit the damage from strict insistence on the 
observance of constitutional rights. 
Indeed, even those jurists who have resisted the erosion of the 
exclusionary rule need not be understood as constitutional absolutists.  Rather, it 
may make more sense to understand their view as one that simply strikes a 
different balance from the balance that their tougher-on-crime colleagues strike.188  
For the would-be strict enforcers of the exclusionary rule, the long-term damage 
that comes from admitting unlawfully obtained evidence may seem greater than 
the harm that comes from occasionally permitting a guilty defendant to go free.189 
If a weighing of costs and benefits underlies the Justices’ avoidance of 
absolutism by commonly rejecting the application of the exclusionary rule as a 
remedy for acknowledged constitutional violations, no such open weighing is 
visible in their efforts to deal with circumstances in which two rights conflict.  
The Supreme Court’s discussion of the options on offer in Nebraska Press Ass’n 
was typical for American jurisprudence in its failure to engage in open balancing, 
and in that respect the United States is an outlier.  In most other constitutional 
democracies, a court (or other constitutional interpreter) would view a conflict 
between two rights (or any two constitutional provisions) as calling for 
balancing.190  A court (or other actor) would ask, which right should prevail in the 
particular circumstances?  The following figure illustrates the difference between 
accommodation of the Nebraska Press Ass’n sort and European or Canadian style 
balancing. 
 
 
                                                            
188 Cf. Stewart, supra note 60, at 1404 (“I have suggested that the exclusionary rule is a 
constitutionally mandated remedy, necessary to enforce the fourth and fourteenth amendments, 
and that proposals to modify the rule must preserve an effective remedy.”) 
189 See, e.g., John P. Gross, Dangerous Criminals, the Search for the Truth and Effective Law 
Enforcement: How the Supreme Court Overestimates the Social Costs of the Exclusionary Rule, 
51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 545, 570-71 (2011). 
190 See Jamal Greene, The Rule of Law as a Law of Standards, 99 GEO. L.J. 1289, 1291 (2011) 
(“many of the world's most respected constitutional courts, including the courts of Canada, 
Germany, Israel, India, and South Africa, in addition to the European Court of Human Rights and 
the European Court of Justice, incorporate balancing into forms of proportionality analysis.”).  For 
a careful exposition of the stages of balancing as employed in modern rights jurisprudence by one 
of the world’s most important jurists of the last quarter century, see AHARON BARAK, 
PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS (2012).   
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In the accommodation approach, the prevailing right (here the Sixth 
Amendment fair trial right) eats into area that the other right (here the First 
Amendment free press right) would otherwise occupy.  By contrast, in the 
balancing approach, the constitutional decision maker recognizes that the two 
rights overlap (as represented by the shaded area), but then decides that one rather 
than the other right prevails in that area of overlap.  The results may often be the 
same.  Even the processes of reaching those results may be tacitly similar.  But 
the balancing approach has the comparative virtue of transparency: Courts (and 
other actors) openly admit both that there is a conflict between the constitutional 
provisions and that they are favoring one rather than the other approach. 
We think that the choice between accommodation and balancing will often 
be a matter of labels, although perhaps not always.  As a formal matter, American 
constitutional law resists balancing and tends to be more libertarian than the 
constitutional and human rights law of other jurisdictions,191 but the United States 
is a more libertarian (and less egalitarian) country than nearly all other 
constitutional democracies in other respects as well.192  Accordingly, it is hardly 
clear that U.S. constitutional law is libertarian because it eschews balancing rather 
                                                            
191 See Stavros Tsakyrakis, Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?, 7 Int'l J. Const. L. 468, 
469-75 (2009). 
192 See, e.g., JAMES W. RUSSELL, DOUBLE STANDARD: SOCIAL POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE 
UNITED STATES 50-52, 59 (2010).  
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than vice-versa.  In any event, our interest in the choice between accommodation 
and open balancing has little to do with the choice between libertarianism and 
egalitarianism. 
Even under most balancing approaches, courts typically say that after the 
balancing is completed, the course of action that vindicates the winning right (or 
other provision) is constitutionally permissible  (or, in the case of a multinational 
human rights treaty such as the European Convention on Human Rights, 
permitted by the treaty).193  In that sense, rights balancing is not a perfect model 
for the choice we seek to understand here, because we are interested in how to 
decide among unconstitutional options.  Nonetheless, balancing as performed by 
courts and other actors in other constitutional democracies is still a better model 
for the choice among unconstitutional options than is accommodation because in 
balancing, unlike in accommodation, the element of choice is apparent. 
By contrast with accommodationist approaches that suppress or deny the 
existence of conflict among constitutional values, balancing approaches more 
clearly acknowledge what Michael Walzer has termed the problem of “dirty 
hands.”194  The core idea is that political actors and others sometimes face “tragic 
choices” in which any choice they make (including the choice to do nothing) will 
be a choice to do evil.  (The William Styron novel Sophie’s Choice—in which 
Nazis force a woman to choose which of her two children to sacrifice in order that 
the other may be spared195—presents a dramatic example in the personal realm.)  
They have reason to choose the least bad option but doing so remains wrongful.  
In the legal academic literature, Oren Gross has built on the insights of Walzer 
and others to develop a set of principles for the legal system to evaluate extra-
constitutional decision-making.196 
We take no position here on the exact approach proposed by Walzer, 
Gross or anyone else.  Our point in invoking their work is much more basic: 
Whether we like it or not, life sometimes presents tragic choices in which there 
are no good options; and likewise with the law.  In the latter circumstances, 
insistence on compliance with constitutional rules will be futile (if there are truly 
no permissible options), catastrophic (if there are technically permissible options 
that will lead to a catastrophe but one insists on absolute adherence to such rules 
anyway) or question begging (if one uses an accommodationist strategy to 
suppress the conflict). 
Summarizing the principles that have emerged in this sub-Part, we would 
emphasize three points: (1) After giving priority to minimizing constitutional 
harm, legal actors finding themselves with no constitutional options should 
attempt to minimize sub-constitutional harm; but (2) minimizing constitutional 
harm should not be given absolute priority, so that where sub-constitutional harm 
                                                            
193 See I.A. v. Turkey, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 590. 
194 Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, in WAR AND MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 62 (Marshall Cohen et al, eds., 1974). 
195 WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE’S CHOICE (Modern Library 1998) (1979). 
196 See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1105 (2003) (invoking Walzer as well as Max Weber). 
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exceeds a catastrophic threshold, legal actors may sometimes even be justified in 
choosing an unconstitutional course over a constitutional one; and (3) in choosing 
among unconstitutional options, it is better to acknowledge conflict than to re-
categorize constitutional violations in ways that suppress or disguise conflict. 
 
D) Preserve, to the Extent Possible, the Ability to Undo or Remedy 
Constitutional Violations 
 
 Our final general principle states that government officials choosing 
among unconstitutional options should preserve, to the extent possible, their own 
ability and the ability of other actors, to undo or remedy constitutional violations.  
Often the choice among unconstitutional options will be controversial.  Indeed, 
sometimes it will not even be clear that one or another proposed course of action 
really is unconstitutional.  Accordingly, it should weigh in favor of some 
proposed choice that it is readily reversible. 
To the extent that a choice among putatively unconstitutional options is 
controversial because of a contest over constitutional meaning, political actors 
ought to strive to ensure that their choice permits expeditious judicial review.  
This factor arguably cuts against our own prioritization in the debt ceiling 
trilemma.  Recall that by our lights, the President’s two worst unconstitutional 
options were unilaterally cutting spending and unilaterally raising taxes, while his 
least bad unconstitutional option was to issue Presidential bonds.  Yet cutting 
spending or raising taxes would likely lead to justiciable cases, whereas issuing 
Presidential bonds might not. 
A decision to cut spending would quickly lead to a lawsuit by a person or 
entity legally entitled to receive funding absent the cut.197  Likewise, a decision to 
raise taxes would likely lead to a lawsuit by some party whose resulting tax 
liability increased.  To be sure, given the Anti-Injunction Act,198 a taxpayer could 
not seek to enjoin the assessment or collection of his increased taxes, but once he 
paid the tax, he could sue for a refund in the Tax Court, with review in the Article 
III courts, including the potential for certiorari review by the Supreme Court, to 
follow.  But a lawsuit challenging the President’s decision to issue Presidential 
bonds would not necessarily lead to litigation. 
Would anyone suffer the sort of concrete and particularized injury needed 
to authorize Article III standing as a consequence of the issuance of Presidential 
bonds?  If the government were to fail to pay interest or principal to the holder of 
a Presidential bond, then the bondholder would clearly suffer injury.  But what if 
the government does not default?  Perhaps holders of non-Presidential bonds 
might worry that by increasing the total debt, Presidential bonds make it less 
likely that they will receive payment—much in the way that the holder of a first 
mortgage on a home might worry that the homeowner’s further indebtedness to 
new lenders puts the initial loan at greater risk.  Yet as we explained above, the 
                                                            
197 Clinton v. City of New York is a straightforward precedent.  The City of New York successfully 
challenged spending cuts that President Clinton made under the Line Item Veto Act. 
198 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006). 
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principles of default risk applicable to private parties do not apply to a sovereign 
lending in its own currency.199  Moreover, the whole point of the Presidential 
bonds would be to prevent default on existing obligations, and so it seems highly 
speculative to say that the Presidential bonds increase default risk.  In any event, 
even if the Presidential bonds did increase default risk somewhat, the increased 
risk of a default in the indefinite future does not count as the sort of “imminent” 
injury that the Court’s cases require for Article III standing.200  Thus, it appears 
that a decision to issue Presidential bonds would be substantially more difficult to 
challenge in court than a Presidential decision to cut spending or raise taxes. 
Does that fact lead us to reassess our priority among the elements of the 
trilemma?  In a word, no.  It is true that judicial reviewability counts for 
something, but here the reason why there would be no judicial review of the 
Presidential bonds is a double-edged sword that is much sharper on its other edge.  
No one has standing to challenge the Presidential bonds because no one is injured 
by them.  In the overall cost-benefit analysis, surely the fact that Presidential 
bonds cause no concrete and imminent harm counts mostly in their favor, not 
against them.  We do not claim that Presidential bonds are necessarily harmless.  
Relative to spending cuts and tax increases, Presidential bonds increase the 
national debt, which could have adverse long-term consequences.  But spending 
cuts and tax increases also could have adverse long-term consequences and, in 
addition, they cause immediate injuries in a way that the Presidential bonds do 
not.  How one nets out the various short-term and long-term costs and benefits of 
each possible course of action is a very complicated question.  Our point for now 
is simply that the absence of any concrete and imminent harm to an identifiable 
party probably counts in favor of Presidential bonds by an amount that may well 
outweigh the cost in forgone judicial review. 
In any event, judicial review is no panacea.  A court could decide a multi-
lemma case in a way that makes clear that one course of action is preferred.  For 
example, a court might decide that the President has the power to cut spending 
after all.  But assuming a case in which there truly are no (non-catastrophic) 
constitutional options, a reviewing court does not face the same decision that a 
political actor does. 
For concreteness, suppose that faced with the trilemma, the President 
chooses to cut spending and that a canceled beneficiary challenges the cuts.  A 
reviewing court cannot simply rule that the spending cut was unconstitutional 
because, by hypothesis, anything the President might have done would have been 
unconstitutional.  But as we have unpacked the President’s trilemma, selecting a 
course of action requires a delicate blend of constitutional and policy analysis.  
We can well imagine that the best course for a President in resolving the trilemma 
would be to issue Presidential bonds but that the courts ought to uphold the 
President’s selection of any of the horns of the trilemma as a reasonable exercise 
of his discretion.  We can even sympathize with a holding that a complaint 
charging the President (or other political actor) with choosing the wrong 
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unconstitutional option ought to be non-justiciable.  In this view, the President 
does not face a naked policy choice in choosing among unconstitutional options 
but the relevant constitutional and policy guideposts leave him with sufficient 
discretion to render the matter a political question. 
Whether or not a particular choice among unconstitutional options would 
lead to a justiciable case or controversy, political actors ought to try to take 
actions that can be undone by other political actors.  That is especially true 
where—as in the debt ceiling trilemma—the core concern is separation of 
powers.201  Because the President, no matter what he does, will end up stepping 
on the toes of Congress, he ought to ensure that Congress can specify which toes 
it wants stepped on (or conversely, which toes it most wants to avoid being 
stepped on). 
We argued in Part III that the prior choices of Congress indicate that it 
placed a higher priority on having its decisions about taxing and spending 
respected than about having the borrowing limit respected.  That conclusion was 
substantially based on the detailed political tradeoffs that go into taxing and 
spending laws, by contrast with the simple selection of a number for the debt 
ceiling.202   The same factors lead us to conclude that a Presidential decision to 
spend or tax unilaterally would be more disruptive of the legal status quo than a 
decision to issue Presidential bonds, and thus substantially more difficult for 
Congress to undo.  That is because the departure from Congress’s choices could 
create a dramatically different political status quo, thus calling into play a new set 
of political forces.  If some members of Congress do not like the choices the 
President makes in canceling spending or raising taxes, the new political reality 
may prevent them from restoring the prior status quo, even though Congress 
never voted for the particular set of compromises entailed by the President’s 
unilateral action.203  Just as legislation can be “sticky,”204 so can acts taken by the 
President that usurp legislative power. 
Put most simply, because a Presidential decision to cut spending or raise 
taxes unilaterally usurps substantially more legislative power than a decision to 
issue Presidential bonds, cutting spending or raising taxes will generally be 
stickier.  If judicial review of a Presidential decision to cut spending or raise taxes 
is more likely to occur than judicial review of the decision to issue Presidential 
bonds, effective Congressional review of the Presidential bonds is more likely 
than effective Congressional review of unilateral spending cuts or tax increases.  
                                                            
201 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) (“Concern of encroachment and 
aggrandizement . . . has animated our separation-of-powers jurisprudence. . .”). 
202 See supra text accompanying notes 121-124. 
203 In an important article, Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn explained how judicial and 
administrative constructions of statutes can change the legal status quo against which the vector 
sum of political forces in Congress operates.   See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, 
The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992).  Our point here is that a Presidential 
decision to cancel spending or impose taxes can be equally or more disruptive and can preclude a 
Congressional “fix” in much the same way. 
204 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 Yale 
L.J. 1665, 1667-69 (2002). 
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And where, as in the debt crisis case, the core concern is separation of powers, 
preserving the opportunity for effective Congressional review strikes us as more 
important than facilitating judicial review. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The debt ceiling crisis of August, 2011 nearly presented President Obama 
with a trilemma of unconstitutional options.  Should he or a future President ever 
squarely face such a trilemma, he would have no good choices and certainly no 
good constitutional choices.  But choose the President must.  He should do so in a 
manner that minimizes the unconstitutional assumption of power, minimizes sub-
constitutional harm, and maximally preserves the ability of other actors to undo or 
remedy constitutional violations.  In the debt ceiling context, given the balance of 
constitutional, practical, and prudential considerations, the least unconstitutional 
choice would be for the President to continue to issue debt, in the amounts 
authorized by the duly-enacted budget of the United States. 
